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Concocting Criminal Intent
DEBORAH W. DENNO*
My empirical study, which examines neuroscience evidence in 800
criminal cases over the course of two decades, is the first to determine
how, when, and why victim brain scan evidence is introduced and used in
court. My study reveals that although courts commonly rely on brain
scans to show the extent of a victim’s injury, the actual application of this
neuroscience evidence extends far beyond the purpose for which it is
admitted. Indeed, victim brain scans are introduced primarily by prosecu-
tors, and nearly half of these cases are based on medical expert testi-
mony that the victims suffer from shaken baby syndrome, a medical
diagnosis with controversial scientific underpinnings and distorted legal
ramifications. The diagnosis often successfully serves as the sole founda-
tion for a prosecutor’s case, with no proof of the defendant’s act or intent
beyond the victim’s brain scan and the accompanying medical expert
testimony. Shaken baby syndrome cases thus portray a troubling phenom-
enon in which the key element of mens rea is either unclear or over-
looked altogether and prosecutors are permitted to concoct intent out of
brain scans that were admitted for the sole purpose of presenting the
victim’s injury. My study further reveals that shaken baby syndrome cases
are merely the more transparent examples of the criminal justice system’s
failure to deal adequately with the surging influx of neuroscience evi-
dence into the courtroom. Shaken baby cases thus represent a microcosm
of prosecutorial misuse of victim neuroscience evidence more generally,
particularly when the evidence is employed to determine a defendant’s
mental state.
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earlier versions of this Article, I thank the participants for presentations given at the Annual Conference
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INTRODUCTION
On June 21, 1999, Jacquelyn Swart was babysitting a fourteen-month-old girl
named Alexandra (Alex) Pirkins.1 Swart, a mother of two who had previously
worked at a daycare facility, had been providing daycare for Alex in Swart’s
apartment for the past year.2 Around 2:00 p.m. that day, Swart lifted Alex out of
her playpen and noticed that the child was limp and motionless, with her head
“flopped back.”3 Swart immediately placed several calls to Alex’s mother, who
came to the apartment.4 The women called 911 and paramedics rushed Alex to
the hospital.5
Dr. Jose Quinones, a physician who treated Alex at the hospital, observed that
Alex was “very pale and unresponsive . . . but she presented no outward signs
of injury.”6 However, because Alex was having seizures, he ordered brain scans,
which revealed internal bleeding and swelling in Alex’s brain.7 Based on these
neurological findings, along with Alex’s clinical condition and the brain scan,
Dr. Quinones diagnosed Alex with shaken baby syndrome (SBS)—a brain
injury that is presumably caused by someone shaking an infant or toddler’s head
with such force that it can destroy brain cells and cause permanent brain
damage or death.8 Swart, who had no criminal record, was arrested despite her
insistence that she “had never handled Alex roughly, nor shaken her,
nor . . . struck her in any way.”9
At trial, the State called seven medical experts who testified that Alex’s
injuries were consistent with a diagnosis of SBS,10 as well as two rebuttal
witnesses who testified that Alex’s death was caused by “an abusive head
injury” and not by pre-existing injury.11 In contrast, the defense never rebutted
the SBS diagnosis. Rather, the defense argued that Alex died from accidental
injuries that occurred in the weeks and days prior to her hospitalization and
called four experts in support of that theory.12 Swart was nonetheless convicted
of first-degree murder and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.13 On appeal,
Swart argued that without any other evidence apart from SBS to prove her guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt, expert testimony regarding SBS “was insuffi-
1. People v. Swart, 860 N.E.2d 1142, 1145, 1147–48 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
2. Id. at 1145.
3. Id. at 1149.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 1149–50.
6. Id. at 1150.
7. Swart, 860 N.E.2d at 1150. Dr. Quinones had ordered CT scans “because Alex exhibited cerebrate
posturing, a reflexive movement of the spinal cord without any control from the upper central nervous
system, manifested by the hyperextension of the feet, hands, and legs.” Id.
8. Id. at 1150, 1153. For a fuller discussion of the definition of SBS and the complexity behind it, see
infra notes 104–20 and accompanying text.
9. Swart, 860 N.E.2d at 1145–46.
10. Id. at 1151–54.
11. Id. at 1156.
12. Id. at 1154–56.
13. Id. at 1145.
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cient.”14 In 2006, the appellate court rejected this argument.15 Swart remains
incarcerated to this day.16
People v. Swart is representative of a typical SBS case.17 In typical cases,
scientific evidence forms the only foundation for determining whether the child
has been abused and by whom, as well as for proving the perpetrator’s intent (to
abuse, harm, or kill) and guilt.18 Thus, brain scans and medical expert testimony
carry immense weight at trial, as does the diagnosis of SBS itself.19 Yet the
history of SBS reveals that such a diagnosis was never intended to be used in
the courtroom at all, much less as a vehicle for determining a defendant’s level
of intent.20 Still, these and other cases that relied on evidence of a victim’s brain
injury essentially enable the prosecution to concoct the defendant’s level of
intent from a complex and convoluted science in which the victim has no (or
limited) external signs of injury.21 This science is widely acknowledged to be
controversial and problematic;22 nonetheless, physicians throughout the world
rely on SBS as an established medical diagnosis for assessing the health and
status of potentially injured infants.23 When an SBS diagnosis enters the
courtroom, however, it triggers legal ramifications that extend beyond what
physicians might anticipate.24
The rising acceptance of neuroscience evidence such as brain scans has
fueled a heated debate in the criminal justice system.25 As “the branch of the life
sciences that studies the brain and nervous system,”26 neuroscience can reveal a
14. Id. at 1156.
15. Swart, 860 N.E.2d at 1160.
16. See Internet Inmate Status, R76046–Swart, Jacquelyn, ILL. DEP’T OF CORR., https://www.idoc.state.
il.us/subsections/search/inms_print.asp?idocR76046 [https://perma.cc/M8T6-3QT6].
17. Swart, 860 N.E.2d 1142.
18. See infra Part III.
19. See infra Part III.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Parts III, IV.
22. Compare Christopher Spencer Greeley, “Shaken Baby Syndrome” and Forensic Pathology, 10
FORENSIC SCI., MED., & PATHOLOGY 253, 254 (2014) (“Uncertainties remain regarding aspects of AHT
[abusive head trauma or SBS], for example the frequency and duration of lucidity after a fatal injury in
infants, the role of neck injury in suspected AHT patients, or the differences between single and
repeated episodes of brain injury.”), with Daniel M. Albert et al., Ensuring Appropriate Expert
Testimony for Cases Involving the “Shaken Baby,” 308 JAMA 39, 39 (2012) (discussing “evidence-
based, peer-reviewed medical literature with 40 years of contributions by pediatricians, neuroradiolo-
gists, clinical and forensic pathologists, ophthalmologists, and physiologists clearly supporting the
construct of a medical diagnosis for AHT”).
23. See Sandeep K. Narang et al., A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head Trauma/Shaken Baby
Syndrome, 11 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 505, 574–76 (2011) (providing verifiable references to fifteen
national and international medical societies that have publicly endorsed the validity of SBS as a
medical diagnosis).
24. See infra Parts III, IV.
25. See generally Joshua Greene & Jonathan Cohen, For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing
and Everything, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y B: BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1775 (2004) (discussing key
debates regarding the criminal law and neuroscience).
26. NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW: BRAIN, MIND, AND THE SCALES OF JUSTICE 206 (Brent Garland ed.,
2004); see also OWEN D. JONES ET AL., LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 762 (2014) (defining neuroscience as
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reservoir of information about how the human brain works while healthy and
while injured, thereby going to the core of key concerns pertaining to the
criminal law.27 Yet the criminal justice system’s over-reliance on neuroscience
can be severely misleading, potentially prompting unjustified presumptions
regarding a defendant’s level of intentionality.28
In most cases, a crime must have two key components: the mens rea
(literally, a “guilty mind”), which refers to the defendant’s mental state at the
time he or she commits the crime; and the actus reus, which refers to the
defendant’s voluntary act that causes the social harm.29 In essence, a defen-
dant’s guilt is based on the “fundamental predicate”30 that “an evil-meaning
mind” must accompany “an evil-doing hand” in order to fairly gauge a defen-
dant’s culpability and ensure that punishments are proportionate to mental
blameworthiness.31 Although the meaning of mens rea has fluctuated across
twelve centuries,32 by the twentieth century the concept had become a “univer-
sal” requirement of modern legal systems.33
This legal mandate for mens rea has been continuously reinforced, both by
the U.S. Supreme Court34 and by proposals considered by Congress recommend-
ing “mens rea reform.”35 There has been a growing concern, for example, that
mens rea requirements are not always sufficiently specified in state and federal
“[t]he scientific study of the structure and function of the nervous system; includes experimental and
clinical studies of animals and humans”).
27. JONES ET AL., supra note 26, at 762; Deborah W. Denno, The Myth of the Double-Edged Sword:
An Empirical Study of Neuroscience Evidence in Criminal Cases, 56 B.C. L. REV. 493, 504–05 (2015).
28. See infra Part III.
29. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.01 (7th ed. 2015).
30. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 explanatory note (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft and Explanatory
Notes 1985).
31. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251–52 (1952) (emphasizing the central thought that a
defendant must be “blameworthy in mind” in order to be criminal); see also Deborah W. Denno,
Criminal Law in a Post-Freudian World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 601, 609–13 (discussing the historical
development of the requirements for culpability and blameworthiness).
32. For a broad overview of the history and purpose of mens rea, see generally GUYORA BINDER,
CRIMINAL LAW ch. 5 (2016); Gerhard O.W. Mueller, On Common Law Mens Rea, 42 MINN. L. REV.
1043 (1958); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974 (1932); J.W.C. Turner, The Mental
Element in Crimes at Common Law, 6 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 31 (1936).
33. Morissette, 342 U.S. at 250.
34. See, e.g., Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (emphasizing the importance of mens
rea in criminal statutes); see also infra notes 61–65 and accompanying text (discussing Elonis).
35. Alex Sarch, How to Solve the Biggest Issue Holding Up Criminal Justice Reform, POLITICO.COM
(May 16, 2016, 5:25 AM), http://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2016/05/criminal-justice-reform-mens-
rea-middle-ground-000120 [https://perma.cc/FD2S-4RK5] (noting that although Congress intended to
pass legislation in 2016 to improve the criminal justice system, there were vast disagreements between
both parties concerning how to reform mens rea, “a very real problem”); see also Mike Debonis, The
Issue That Could Keep Congress From Passing Criminal Justice Reform, WASH. POST (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/wp/2016/01/20/the-issue-that-could-keep-congress-
from-passing-criminal-justice-reform/?utm_term.f12204dfd4da [https://perma.cc/NJX7-T8FH] (dis-
cussing “a narrow but crucial issue that has emerged as the main political obstacle to a criminal justice
reform bill: to what degree prosecutors must prove a defendant’s criminal intent in order to win
convictions for certain federal crimes”); infra note 68 and accompanying text.
2017] 327CONCOCTING CRIMINAL INTENT
statutes.36 Neuroscience evidence further highlights the significance of mens rea
by providing more refined and detailed information about how the human mind
operates.37
To prove a mental state such as intent, the criminal justice system theoreti-
cally relies on both direct and indirect (that is, circumstantial) evidence.38 If
police find a victim dead from a gunshot wound in the victim’s home, for
example, there would be direct evidence available if a witness said that she saw
the defendant shoot the victim. However, without such a witness, only circum-
stantial evidence would be available if the defendant was the only person home
when the victim died from a gunshot wound.39 Thus, when juries rely on
circumstantial evidence, they “must make a leap of logic and infer the existence
of a fact at issue, connecting a circumstantial fact to a directly incriminating
fact.”40 Relative to direct evidence, these kinds of assessments can be more
prone to manipulation because jurors have more evidentiary gaps to fill.41
Prosecutors often must attempt to prove a defendant’s intent through circum-
stantial evidence.42 Yet because these intent determinations provide prosecutors
36. See Sarch, supra note 35 (explaining that “[m]ens rea reform is meant to solve a very real
problem: the dangers of criminal statutes that include no intent requirement at all”).
37. Deborah W. Denno, The Place for Neuroscience in Criminal Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS
OF LAW AND NEUROSCIENCE 69, 77–80 (Dennis Patterson & Michael S. Pardo eds., 2016); Joseph R.
Simpson, Introduction to NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY: FROM THE CLINIC TO THE COURTROOM xv,
xv–xvii (Joseph R. Simpson ed., 2012).
38. See Julie Schmidt Chauvin, Comment, “For It Must Seem Their Guilt”: Diluting Reasonable
Doubt by Rejecting the Reasonable Hypothesis of Innocence Standard, 53 LOY. L. REV. 217, 221–22
(2007). For a discussion on the differences, advantages, and weaknesses inherent in direct and
circumstantial evidence, see 29A AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 1390 (2015); BARBARA E. BERGMAN ET AL.,
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL EVIDENCE § 1:8 (15th ed. 1997). Courts usually recognize that equal weight should
be attributed to both circumstantial and direct evidence. See Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121,
140 (1954) (noting that “[c]ircumstantial evidence . . . is intrinsically no different from testimonial
evidence” and that although “circumstantial evidence may in some cases point to a wholly incorrect
result . . . this is equally true of testimonial evidence”); Francis Paul Greene, Comment, I Ain’t Got No
Body: The Moral Uncertainty of Bodiless Murder Jurisprudence In New York After People v. Bieren-
baum, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2863, 2875 (2003) (emphasizing that although “New York courts have long
recognized that a unique danger inheres in criminal cases built entirely on circumstantial evi-
dence . . . [they] agree that circumstantial evidence is often more probative than direct evidence”).
39. See Chauvin, supra note 38, at 222–23 (noting that jurors are more apt to rely on their own
personal experiences with circumstantial evidence without considering contrary evidence).
40. Greene, supra note 38, at 2876.
41. See id.
42. Courts view circumstantial evidence as particularly important when proof of “intent” or some
other mental state is required for conviction because such mental states can rarely be proven through
direct evidence. See, e.g., 29A AM. JUR. 2D EVIDENCE § 1392 (2015); see also United States v. Sullivan,
522 F.3d 967, 978 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Intent may be established through circumstantial evidence.”).
Further, in many cases, proving intent or some other mental state requires the use of circumstantial
evidence, given that direct evidence of the defendant’s mental state is rarely available. See, e.g.,
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & PETER J. HENNING, 2A FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 411 (4th ed. 2009)
(describing the use of circumstantial evidence in certain kinds of cases, including those requiring proof
of criminal intent, as “indispensable”); see also United States v. Stoker, 706 F.3d 643, 646 (5th Cir.
2013) (“Intent may, and generally must, be proven circumstantially.” (quoting United States v. Maggitt,
784 F.2d 590, 593 (5th Cir. 1986))); United States v. Smith, 508 F.3d 861, 867 (8th Cir. 2007) (stating
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with more opportunities to distort the facts, the line between acceptable and
unacceptable uses of circumstantial evidence begins to blur. Prosecutors have
the freedom to somewhat “concoct” the defendant’s level of intent and push the
boundaries of inference in all types of cases. The vague construction of mens
rea, and specifically of criminal intent, further fosters this practice.43 For
example, my study of SBS cases revealed that the diagnosis of SBS alone often
successfully serves as the sole foundation for a prosecutor’s case, with no proof
of the defendant’s act or intent beyond the victim’s brain scan and accompany-
ing medical expert testimony.44 At the same time, a substantial portion of the
public does not realize that shaking a baby can be harmful (assuming there was
any shaking at all).45 SBS cases therefore present a troubling circumstance in
which prosecutors seem to be afforded free rein, by both the court and the
defense, to manufacture intent from neuroscience evidence admitted solely for
medical purposes to present the victim’s injury.46
Large-scale research studies of criminal cases can better reveal how and why
these legal strategies exist. This Article reports the results of my unprecedented
study (the “Neuroscience Study”) of all criminal cases (totaling 800) that
addressed neuroscience evidence from 1992 to 2012.47 The discussion focuses
on cases that use neuroscientific evidence relating to the victim and particularly
on how neuroscience evidence explicates the degree of a victim’s injury and
what bearing that injury has on efforts to assess a defendant’s mens rea. One of
the Neuroscience Study’s most compelling findings is that prosecutors most
commonly rely on SBS to explain the source of victims’ injuries.48 My initial
results also show that when prosecutors use victim neuroscience evidence, they
are often attempting to establish a defendant’s mental state based on the type
and extent of brain injury suffered by the victim, with SBS cases constituting a
high proportion of these cases.49
The medical diagnosis of SBS seems to become inextricably linked to the
requisite legal elements of a crime, such that the mere existence of the syn-
drome suggests the defendant’s wrongful intent. In addition, courts seem to
ignore evidence that 25% to 50% of the general public is “unaware of the
that a jury “rarely has direct evidence of a defendant’s knowledge, [and] it is generally established
through circumstantial evidence” (quoting United States v. Ojeda, 23 F.3d 1473, 1476 (8th Cir. 1994))).
Thus, the uses for circumstantial evidence in showing intent and other mental states are numerous and
widely accepted. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 739 F.3d 1160, 1169 (8th Cir. 2014) (“A large
quantity of narcotics alone provides sufficient circumstantial evidence for a jury to infer an intent to
distribute it.”).
43. See Sanford H. Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 273 (1968).
44. See infra Sections III.A, III.B.
45. See infra note 50 and accompanying text.
46. See infra Parts III, IV.
47. See infra Section I.B (discussing in more detail the Neuroscience Study’s methodology and
choice of years).
48. See infra note 95 and accompanying text.
49. See infra Parts III, IV.
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dangers” and risks associated with shaking a baby.50 SBS cases thus illustrate
the worst type of union between law and medicine. In this Article, I will argue
that cases involving SBS also represent a microcosm of prosecutorial misuse of
victim neuroscience evidence, and I will demonstrate how such cases contribute
to a “perfect storm” of the legal and scientific factors that can lead to such
misuse.51 In essence, SBS cases are one of the more transparent examples of the
criminal justice system’s failure to deal adequately with the surging influx of
neuroscience evidence into the courtroom, particularly when it involves determin-
ing a defendant’s mental state.
Part I of this Article discusses the importance of mens rea in criminal law. It
also examines the results of my Neuroscience Study, noting that prosecutors
commonly explain the source of infant victims’ injuries by relying upon a
theory of SBS. Such a strategy helps to construct both a defendant’s mens rea
and actus reus, particularly because most cases have little or no direct or
circumstantial evidence.
Part II examines the history of SBS from its inception in 1971 to the present.
The discussion also focuses on the factors that have contributed to the syn-
drome’s perfect storm of distortion and misuse. By the time the syndrome was
first introduced in a criminal case in 1984, the ties between SBS and the
requisite elements of an offense—particularly the act of “shaking” and the
perpetrator’s intent—had become firmly established within the medical commu-
nity.52 Yet the SBS link to criminal intent has no basis of support in medicine.53
Part III analyzes individual SBS case studies selected from my Neuroscience
Study to demonstrate how heavily the State relies in court on the troubling
science of SBS, as well as on medical experts to explain that science. Problems
arise when a diagnosis such as SBS, created for the purpose of medical care and
50. Michelle G.K. Ward et al., Prevention of Shaken Baby Syndrome: Never Shake a Baby, 9
PAEDIATRICS & CHILD HEALTH 319, 320–21 (2004); see also infra Section II.D (discussing the uninten-
tional caretaker).
51. See infra Parts III, IV.
52. See infra Section II.B.
53. See infra Sections II.C, D. The link between a diagnosis of SBS and intent is not supported in
medicine because (1) SBS is not necessarily caused by shaking, despite what prosecutors want the jury
to believe, and (2) even if a case of SBS was caused by shaking, this finding alone does not establish
the requisite mens rea. For example, even if a parent or caretaker does admit to having intended to
shake the baby and actually did shake the baby, this act does not necessarily mean the caretaker
intended to kill or harm the baby. It may seem obvious to some that shaking a baby is dangerous or
risky given the fragility of babies’ brains, necks, and bodies, but a substantial portion of individuals are
not aware of these dangers and risks. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. With shaking, it is
important to point out that some parents commonly shake their babies to get them to stop crying but not
to kill them or hurt them. In those instances, wrongdoing is not conscious to the criminal. See infra
Section II.D; see also Jacy Showers, Preventing Shaken Baby Syndrome, in THE SHAKEN BABY
SYNDROME: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 349, 353 (Stephen Lazoritz & Vincent J. Palusci eds., 2001)
(noting that “caretakers of children ‘may be unaware of the specific injuries they may cause by shaking’
and may perceive shaking as less abusive or less culpable than other forms of child ‘discipline’” and
that “there has been some speculation that subservience to an adult’s wishes is a more primary goal than
injury to the child” (citations omitted)).
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prevention, is hijacked by the legal system for the purpose of criminal prosecu-
tion. The case studies, which are exemplary, share three characteristics: (1) the
prosecution depends nearly entirely on an SBS diagnosis for its theory and
argument, without which there would be no case or a case with a substantially
lesser charge; (2) the prosecution focuses on proving that the defendant in-
tended the shaking actions, as opposed to proving more accurate levels of mens
rea such as recklessness or negligence or bringing no charge at all; and (3) the
prosecution stresses a causal connection between the defendant’s mens rea and
actus reus even though such a connection is not warranted by either law or
science.
Part IV demonstrates the extent of such prosecutorial deference to victim
neuroscience evidence. My Neuroscience Study shows that when attorneys use
victim neuroscience evidence at the trial level, the prosecution dominates its
introduction and subsequent application. Thus, SBS evidence is virtually always
used to the benefit of the prosecution and commonly for the purpose of proving
the defendant’s intent.
Part V analyzes some of the Neuroscience Study’s adult-victim cases for two
reasons: (1) to demonstrate that prosecutors’ opportunities to concoct intent are
widespread, extending beyond the SBS cases, and (2) to provide a balanced
perspective on how prosecutors use victim neuroscience evidence within the
starkly different context of adult victims. Although adult-victim cases are more
factually and scientifically varied, prosecutors still employ neuroscience evi-
dence in nearly one-fifth of these cases to reinforce a determination of the
defendant’s mental state.54 The adult-victim cases therefore illustrate the ben-
efits and drawbacks of victim neuroscience evidence when it comes to intent
determinations.
The criminal justice system needs neuroscience to help clarify the vague and
murky territory of establishing a defendant’s mens rea. Yet that science can also
be problematic. Each time science seemingly brings criminal law forward in
terms of a more sophisticated understanding of a defendant’s mental state or a
victim’s injury, it can set the criminal law back if that science is wrongly
applied. The broader problem of concocting intent, then, extends far beyond
SBS cases.
I. WHY INTENT MATTERS
A. THE MODERNIZATION OF MENS REA
The idea that individuals possess mental states indicative of their culpability
has a long history developed throughout at least twelve centuries and swayed in
large part by changing social, cultural, and political ideology.55 By the nine-
54. See infra note 380 and accompanying text.
55. See supra note 32.
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teenth century, the legal requirement of mens rea pervaded the law,56 but there
was extraordinary variation among state criminal statutes concerning how to
define these gradated mental states.57 In response to this confusion, in 1962 the
American Law Institute published the Model Penal Code (MPC), a groundbreak-
ing advance in modernizing the criminal law that reduced the numerous existing
mental-state terms to four categories.58 Under the MPC, a defendant can act
with purpose (synonymous with intent), knowledge, recklessness, or negligence
when engaged in a particular actus reus.59 The MPC’s emphasis on requiring a
mens rea term for every element of an offense corresponded with the estab-
lished doctrine that “wrongdoing must be conscious to be criminal.”60
In Elonis v. United States, one of the Supreme Court’s most recent pronounce-
ments on the importance of mens rea, the Court incorporated the MPC’s four
mens rea standards when explaining its outcome and reasoning.61 In the Court’s
view, purpose or knowledge was a sufficient standard for the mens rea-silent
statute before them, but negligence was not.62 The Court took no position on
whether reckless disregard would suffice for a conviction because the issue was
not raised,63 to the frustration of some Justices. As Justice Samuel Alito noted in
his concurrence, “[a]ttorneys and judges are left to guess.”64 Justice Clarence
Thomas seemingly agreed in his dissent: “Given the majority’s ostensible
concern for protecting innocent actors, one would have expected it to announce
a clear rule—any clear rule. Its failure to do so reveals the fractured foundation
upon which today’s decision rests.”65
Many states have adopted the MPC’s definitions of mens rea;66 yet, as Elonis
shows, they continue to be plagued by vagueness, confusion, manipulation, and
politics.67 Indeed, Congress reviewed a proposal that would have mandated the
use of mens rea in many more cases, recognizing that mens rea terms have been
discarded or sidelined over the years, perhaps in an effort to bypass this
quagmire.68 Because modern neuroscience deals so much with the workings of
the human brain and therefore how individuals think and behave, it can offer
56. See Sayre, supra note 32, at 994–1004.
57. See Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of Criminal Law: An Opinionated Review, 87 CALIF. L. REV.
943, 947 (1999).
58. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 explanatory note (AM. LAW. INST., Official Draft and Explanatory
Notes 1985); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law: Wechsler’s Predecessors, 78
COLUM. L. REV. 1098, 1140 (1978) (noting that the MPC was “stunningly successful in accomplishing
the comprehensive rethinking of the criminal law”).
59. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (AM. LAW. INST., Official Draft and Explanatory Notes 1985).
60. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252 (1952).
61. 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2009–12 (2015).
62. Id. at 2010–13.
63. Id. at 2012.
64. Id. at 2014 (Alito, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 2028 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
66. Kadish, supra note 58, at 1144.
67. See supra notes 61–65 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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greater clarity and insight into interpreting such concepts as intent.69 At the
same time, as this Article discusses, there can be dangers in the way criminal
justice actors use certain types of neuroscience if the legal system does not
provide sufficient safeguards. There may be circumstances, for example, in
which prosecutors use victims’ injuries to “prove,” however dubiously, a defen-
dant’s intent when there is no other kind of circumstantial evidence available.70
The next Section discusses my study of neuroscience evidence and criminal
cases to reveal more thoroughly how brain science can distort the construction
of mens rea.
B. THE NEUROSCIENCE STUDY
Much has been written about the growing impact of neuroscience evidence
on the criminal justice system but, until my Neuroscience Study, there was little
systematic information available about it.71 Of course, courts have relied on
nonimaging neuroscience tests for decades,72 and brain imaging by way of a
computed tomography (CT) X-ray scan was used as early as the 1982 trial of
John Hinckley Jr., President Ronald Reagan’s attempted assassin.73 Yet over the
next decade, defense lawyers slowly started to adopt and prefer the positron
emission tomography (PET) scan,74 and their use of that test started to have an
impact. People v. Weinstein, for example, is believed to be the first case in
which a court admitted testimony concerning the results of PET scans to
determine a defendant’s insanity.75 Weinstein had been charged with the second-
degree murder of his wife.76 The PET scan suggested he suffered from organic
69. See generally NEUROIMAGING IN FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY, supra note 37.
70. See infra Part III.
71. See Denno, supra note 27, at 500–05 (explaining the unique range of the Neuroscience Study).
Other wide-scale empirical research has been recently completed in Canada, England, the Netherlands,
the United States, and Wales. See generally Paul Catley & Lisa Claydon, The Use of Neuroscientific
Evidence in the Courtroom by Those Accused of Criminal Offenses in England and Wales, 2 J.L. &
BIOSCIENCES 510 (2015) (researching England and Wales); Jennifer A. Chandler, The Use of Neuroscien-
tific Evidence in Canadian Criminal Proceedings, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 550 (2015) (researching
Canada); C.H. de Kogel & E.J.M.C. Westgeest, Neuroscientific and Behavioral Genetic Information in
Criminal Cases in the Netherlands, 2 J.L. & BIOSCIENCES 580 (2015) (researching the Netherlands); Nita
A. Farahany, Neuroscience and Behavioral Genetics in US Criminal Law: An Empirical Analysis, 2 J.L.
& BIOSCIENCES 485 (2016) (researching the United States); Lyn M. Gaudet & Gary E. Marchant, Under
the Radar: Neuroimaging Evidence in the Criminal Courtroom, 64 DRAKE L. REV. 577 (2016)
(researching the United States).
72. See generally Deborah W. Denno, Human Biology and Criminal Responsibility: Free Will or
Free Ride?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1988) (discussing the types and applications of early nonimaging
tests).
73. See Virginia Hughes, Head Case, 464 NATURE 340, 341 (2010).
74. Id.
75. See 591 N.Y.S.2d 715, 720, 724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992); see also Cerisse Anderson, Brain Scan
Deemed Admissible at Trial: Guilty Plea Follows Insanity Defense Ruling, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1992, at 3.
But see Zachary Weiss, The Legal Admissibility of Positron Emission Tomography Scans in Criminal
Cases: People v. Spyder Cystkopf, 1 SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY 202, 206 (1996) (stating
that in California courts, PET scans had been admitted in at least eleven previous murder cases).
76. Weinstein, 591 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
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cerebral defects that impaired his judgment during periods of stress, which
Weinstein said included the argument he and his wife were having at the time he
killed her.77 Ultimately, because of the potential impact of the tests on a jury, the
district attorney offered Weinstein a plea bargain and, in 1992, he pled guilty to
first-degree manslaughter.78
The Weinstein case “is important historically” because it came about “well
before” the surge of scholarship examining the connection between law and
neuroscience.79 Thus, the case marks a point in time at which the influx of more
advanced neuroscience techniques was just beginning and is therefore a neurosci-
ence moment worth measuring. For this reason, the Neuroscience Study’s
collection of cases starts at 1992 and the Study’s universe of 800 cases consists
of every criminal law case that addressed neuroscience evidence from January
1, 1992 to December 1, 2012.80 The end point of 2012 enables a two-decade
perspective on the role of neuroscience, with the goal that more data will be
collected and updated in the future.81 For the Study, I used information from
criminal law cases derived from the Westlaw and LexisNexis legal databases to
code and analyze over 150 key factors relevant to how courts and attorneys
apply and interpret neuroscience evidence to reach legal conclusions about
defendants and victims.82
The 800 cases fall into two categories: 286 cases (35.75%) concern neurosci-
ence evidence as it pertains to the victim, primarily to prove the extent of a
victim’s brain injury; and 514 cases (64.25%) concern neuroscience evidence as
it pertains to the defendant, similarly to prove the extent of a defendant’s brain
injury.83 The first category, what I call “victim neuroscience cases,” was particu-
larly valuable. Until the Neuroscience Study, no other researcher had gathered
77. Id. at 725 n.6; Anderson, supra note 75, at 3.
78. Daniel A. Martell, Causal Relation Between Brain Damage and Homicide: The Prosecution, 1
SEMINARS IN CLINICAL NEUROPSYCHIATRY 184, 192–93 (1996). For further discussion of the Weinstein case
and its role in capturing the attention of the neuroscience community, see Deborah W. Denno, Crime
and Consciousness: Science and Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN. L. REV. 269, 377–81 (2002).
79. JONES ET AL., supra note 26, at 41.
80. All cases and case distributions discussed in this Article are available from the Author in an
extensive appendix. See Neuroscience Study App. (on file with Author) [hereinafter “App.”]. The case
selection and coding techniques employed for the Neuroscience Study have been described in depth
elsewhere. See Denno, supra note 27, at 500–01; see also DEBORAH W. DENNO, CHANGING LAW’S MIND:
HOW NEUROSCIENCE CAN HELP US PUNISH CRIMINALS MORE FAIRLY AND EFFECTIVELY (forthcoming 2018).
81. Practically speaking, the collection, coding, and cleaning of these cases is time-consuming and
expensive. It is important to examine what the data are showing first, before moving on to more data
collection and updating.
82. See Denno, supra note 27, at 500–01; see also DENNO, supra note 80 (describing the Neurosci-
ence Study and some of the shortcomings of this method of case selection).
83. See App., supra note 80, at I. Altogether, 39 cases (4.88%) concern neuroscience evidence as it
pertains to both the defendant and the victim because the brains of one or more individuals in both the
“victim” and “defendant” categories were examined. Id. at III. Of the 286 victim neuroscience cases,
then, 247 of the cases (86.36%) contained only victim neuroscience evidence, while 39 of these cases
(13.64%) contained both victim neuroscience evidence and defendant neuroscience evidence. See id. at
I–III. In other articles in which I have analyzed the Neuroscience Study’s data, I have combined the
thirty-nine cases concerning both the defendant and the victim with the defendant-only neuroscience
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enough data to discover these distinctions among neuroscience cases and to
reveal the prevalence and importance of the victim cases. The victim neurosci-
ence cases stand out because they are dominated by the prosecution and a focus
on conviction, whereas defendant neuroscience cases are dominated by the defense
and a focus on mitigation.84 Such disparate goals reveal substantial differences in how
the prosecution and the defense handle neuroscience evidence.85
In the Neuroscience Study, victim neuroscience evidence usually consists of
CT (computerized tomography) scans86 (238 cases or 83.22%), autopsies of the
brain (136 cases or 47.55%), and, to a lesser extent, MRI (magnetic resonance
imaging) scans87 (33 cases or 11.54%).88 A key focus of the Neuroscience Study
was to examine what role victim neuroscience evidence played in court. Surpris-
ingly, of the 310 victims present in the Study (some cases have more than one
victim), the great majority (216 victims or 69.68%) were under age eighteen.89
cases to reach a total of 553 cases pertaining to defendants. See Denno, supra note 27, at 501 (reaching
a total of 553 cases to analyze).
84. See Deborah W. Denno, How Prosecutors and Defense Attorneys Differ in Their Use of
Neuroscience Evidence, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 453, 456–61 (2016) (discussing the different ways the
prosecution and defense approach introducing neuroscience evidence into court).
85. Id.
86. See JONES ET AL., supra note 26, at 757 (describing a CT scan as “[a] neuroimaging technique in
which X-rays of the head are obtained from all angles and mathematically combined to yield a
three-dimensional image of the skull and brain”).
87. See id. (describing an MRI as “[a] neuroimaging technique that provides images of interior brain
structure through systematic variation of the magnetic properties of atoms in gray and white matter”).
88. App., supra note 80, at IV.A–C. Other tests were used to a substantially lesser extent: electroen-
cephalograms (EEGs) appeared in thirteen cases (4.55%); single-photon emission computerized cosmog-
raphy (SPECT) scans appeared in two cases (.70%); magnetic resonance angiography (MRA) scans
appeared in one case (.35%); and angiograms appeared in one case (.35%). Id. at IV.D, IV.F, & IV.I.
There were also seven cases (2.45%) that used “nonimaging” tests, which included neuropsychological
assessments (2 cases or .70%), and neurological assessments (1 case or .35%), as well as the Glasgow
Coma Scale (4 cases or 1.40%). Id. at IV.E, IV.G, & IV.H. The Glasgow Coma Scale is “an objective
standard for measuring brain function along a continuum which begins at [level] three, indicating no
brain function, and ends at [level] fifteen, indicating normal brain function.” See State v. Brown, 311
S.W.3d 422, 427 (Tenn. 2010). For a complete list of the types of victim neuroscience evidence used by
the Neuroscience Study victim cases, see App., supra note 80, at IV.
89. See App., supra note 80, at VI.A–F. The full age breakdown of the 310 victims is as follows:
0 to less than 1 year: 95 (30.65%)
1 to less than 2 years: 44 (14.19%)
2 to less than 5 years: 45 (14.52%)
5 to less than 10 years: 14 (4.52%)
10 to less than 18 years: 4 (1.29%)
Minor Victim but Age Unknown: 14 (4.52%)
18 to less than 30 years: 4 (1.29%)
30 to less than 40 years: 2 (.65%)
40 to less than 50 years: 0 (0%)
50 to less than 60 years: 2 (.65%)
60 to less than 70 years: 2 (.65%)
70 years: 2 (.65%)
Adult Victim but Age Unknown: 82 (26.45%)
Total: 310 cases or 100%
Id. at VI.
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Yet such evidence is used overwhelmingly in cases where the victim is a child,
with close to half of the 310 victims (139 victims or 44.83%) under the age of
two at the time of injury.90 In addition, the majority of the victims (178 victims
or 57.42%) died as a result of their injuries.91 These findings suggest that victim
neuroscience evidence may carry more weight in cases where the victim does
not remember the attack due to infancy or is unavailable to testify due to death
or brain damage. In addition, the most commonly charged offenses against
defendants in these cases reflect the victim profile. In 162 cases (56.64%), the
defendant was charged with a homicide offense,92 and in 122 cases (42.66%),
the defendant was charged with a specific offense against a child.93
Victims’ injuries were attributed to a number of causes, such as assault and
battery or, more often, specific offenses against children.94 Given the young age
of most victims, the frequency of child abuse or neglect charges is to be
expected. Yet within this category, one startling finding emerged: When prosecu-
tors sought to explain the source of victims’ injuries, they most commonly
relied upon a theory of SBS. Indeed, in the sample of 286 victim neuroscience
90. See id. at VI.A–B.
91. See id. at VI.N. Of the 132 victims who survived, 75 of them (56.82%) suffered a significant
brain injury and/or long term effects from their brain injury. See id. at VI.O (the 132 victims who lived)
& VI.P (the 75 victims who lived with traumatic and long-term brain injuries).
92. Id. at VII.A. Such homicide offenses include First-Degree Murder, Second-Degree Murder,
Felony Murder, Manslaughter, or Criminally Negligent Homicide. See id. (citing cases). The full
breakdown of defendant sentences is as follows:
Probation: 2 (.70%) cases
0–10 years: 77 (26.92%) cases
11–30 years: 76 (26.57%) cases
31–50 years: 26 (9.09%) cases
More than 50 years: 15 (5.24%) cases
Potential Life Sentences (for example, 15 years to life): 16 (5.59%) cases
Life Sentences: 48 (16.78%) cases
Death Penalty: 26 (9.09%) cases
Id. at VIII.
93. See App., supra note 80, at VII.B. These specific offenses include Child Abuse, Child Endanger-
ment, or Cruelty to Children. See id. (citing cases). Additionally, there were 91 cases (31.82%) where
the defendant was charged with an assault or battery type offense and 15 cases (5.24%) where the
defendant was charged with a sexual offense. Id. at VII.C–D. For a complete list regarding the most
commonly charged offenses against defendants, see id. at VII. Defendants were convicted of at least
one crime in all of the cases. This result is due in large part to the nature of the Neuroscience Study’s
cases, which consisted almost entirely of appeals. The dispositions of the 286 cases were as follows:
199 (69.58%) convictions affirmed completely, 39 (13.64%) convictions reversed, 17 (5.94%) convic-
tions affirmed with their sentences modified or vacated, 15 (5.24%) convictions reversed in part and
affirmed in part, 10 (3.50%) convictions reinstated after they had been reversed by an intermediary
appellate court, and 6 cases (2.10%) without an appeal of a conviction. Id. at IX. In 280 cases, either the
defendant was appealing his or her conviction (through a direct appeal, a petition for the writ of habeas
corpus, or a motion for postconviction relief) or the State was appealing a decision overturning the
defendant’s conviction. Id. at IX.A–E. Of the remaining 6 cases (2.10%), 1 case involved a motion to
exclude evidence and the other 5 cases were appeals regarding something other than the defendant’s
conviction. See App., supra note 80, at IX.F. However, a subsequent review revealed that all defendants
in these 6 cases were eventually convicted of at least one crime. Id.
94. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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cases, 115 cases (40.21%) involved a diagnosis of SBS.95 Given the prevalence
of SBS cases within the sample of victim neuroscience cases, issues related to
SBS become intertwined with any discussion regarding the use of victim
neuroscience evidence, particularly because prosecutors rely on the evidence so
heavily to prove a defendant’s intent.
There are more findings from my Neuroscience Study that I will discuss
throughout this Article. For now, Part II will examine the origins of, and
controversy surrounding, SBS and how it contributes to a perfect storm for
concocting mens rea.
II. SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME AND THE START OF A PERFECT STORM
This Part reviews the history of SBS, beginning with its inception in 1971 by
its creator Norman Guthkelch.96 By the 1990s, Guthkelch and others argued that
the legal system was misusing the syndrome, a concern that persists to the
present time.97 A combination of events contributed to a perfect storm of
exploitation and distortion, ranging from the growing reliance on brain scans in
courtrooms to the requirement that doctors report all cases that they suspect
may potentially involve child abuse.98 Most important was the increasingly
adopted presumption that SBS is intentionally caused.99
A. ORIGINS AND MEASUREMENT
In 1971, Norman Guthkelch, a British pediatric surgeon, published the
research that would lay the original foundation for SBS.100 After examining
95. See App., supra note 80, at X.A. There were 82 cases (28.67%) involving a form of child abuse
or neglect other than SBS and 81 cases (28.32%) involving assault/battery against adult victims or
teenage minors. Id. at X.B–C.
96. See generally A. N. Guthkelch, Infantile Subdural Haematoma and Its Relationship to Whiplash
Injuries, 2 BRIT. MED. J. 430 (1971).
97. See infra notes 129–31 and accompanying text. A prime example of current litigation concerns
the Texas case of Robert Roberson who, in June 2016, was granted a stay of execution following his
conviction for shaking his young daughter to death. See Ex Parte Roberson, No. WR–63,081–03, 2016
WL 3543332, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 16, 2016); see also infra note 292 (referencing the Roberson
case). Before granting the stay, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was “aware of a sea change in the
medical consensus since [Roberson’s] trial commenced in September 2002 regarding the phenomenon
known as ‘Shaken Baby Syndrome’ (SBS) aka ‘Abusive Head Trauma’ (AHT).” Motion for Stay of
Execution at 3, Ex Parte Roberson, No. WR–63,081–03, 2016 WL 3543332 (Tex. Crim. App. June 16,
2016). Although Roberson suffers from brain damage as well, his defense team claimed that the injuries
inflicted on his two-year-old daughter were not consistent with SBS and that the case was based on
“junk science.” See Johnathan Silver, Court Halts Texas Man’s Execution in “Shaken Baby” Case, TEX.
TRIB. (June 17, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/06/17/appeals-court-halts-east-texas-mans-
execution/ [https://perma.cc/M9B3-MAV2]. The case is ongoing, as are other recent cases. See, e.g.,
People v. Bailey, WL 6644372 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 10, 2016) (granting defendant’s motion for vacatur
of judgment of conviction for second-degree murder based on SBS due to newly discovered evidence
concerning scientific and medical advances that suggest short distance falls could cause substantial
injury or death to a toddler).
98. See infra Section II.B.
99. See infra Section II.B.
100. See Guthkelch, supra note 96, at 430–31.
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thirteen cases in which infants evidenced bleeding in the brain (subdural
hematomas), Guthkelch proposed that such injuries could occur by manually
shaking the infant, without the infant’s head hitting any other surface area.101
Three years later, John Caffey, an American pediatric radiologist, hypothesized
that the rapid acceleration–deceleration forces applied during the shaking sheared
the veins inside the brain, thus causing subdural hematomas, a phenomenon he
called “whiplash shaken infant syndrome.”102 It would take another decade for
the term “shaken baby syndrome” to be mentioned in a publication for the first
time103 and more time still for SBS to be systematically defined by the presence
of three classic symptoms, or “triad”: (1) subdural hematoma, (2) bleeding in
the retina (retinal hemorrhages), and (3) brain swelling (cerebral edema).104
These symptoms can result in a significant brain injury that may cause perma-
nent brain damage or death,105 especially in young children.106 Although SBS
children range in age from birth to five years, SBS occurs most frequently in
babies less than one year old and particularly in those who are newborn to six
months old, when infant crying is at its peak.107 Crying is a frequent trigger for
caregivers who engage in behavior that may lead to a diagnosis of SBS.108
Proper evaluation of SBS can be conducted in several ways: (1) CT scan,
which can measure injuries that need immediate attention; (2) MRI, which
provides a magnetic field and radio waves to show finer images of a child’s
brain; (3) skeletal survey, which entails administering a range of skeletal X-rays
of all the bones (such as extremities, ribs, skull, pelvis, and spine) so examiners
can determine the severity and type of fractures, as well as whether there have
been prior fractures; (4) eye exam, which assesses the presence of bleeding or
other eye injuries; and (5) blood tests, which determine if there are any genetic,
metabolic, or other disorders that look similar to SBS but may provide alterna-
101. See id.
102. John Caffey, The Whiplash Shaken Infant Syndrome: Manual Shaking by the Extremities with
Whiplash-Induced Intracranial and Intraocular Bleedings, Linked with Residual Permanent Brain
Damage and Mental Retardation, 54 PEDIATRICS 396, 401 (1974). Two of Caffey’s earlier articles built
up to this conclusion. See John Caffey, The Parent-Infant Traumatic Stress Syndrome, 114 AM. J.
ROENTGENOLOGY, RADIUM THERAPY & NUCLEAR MED. 217 (1972); John Caffey, On the Theory and
Practice of Shaking Infants, 124 AM. J. DISEASES IN CHILDREN 161 (1972).
103. See Stephen Ludwig & Matt Warman, Shaken Baby Syndrome: A Review of 20 Cases, 13
ANNALS OF EMERGENCY MED. 104, 104 (1984); see also Cindy W. Christian et al., Abusive Head Trauma
in Infants and Children, 123 PEDIATRICS 1409, 1409 (2009) (noting that “Ludwig and Warman first
published the term ‘shaken baby syndrome’” in their 1984 article).
104. See David L. Chadwick et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome—A Forensic Pediatric Response, 101
PEDIATRICS 321, 321 (1998).
105. See Christian et al., supra note 103, at 1410; Showers, supra note 53, at 353.
106. See infra notes 107–08 and accompanying text.
107. See Suzanne Franklin Carbaugh, Understanding Shaken Baby Syndrome, 4 ADVANCES IN
NEONATAL CARE 105, 106, 108 (2004); Preventing Abusive Head Trauma in Children, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/childmaltreatment/abusive-head-trauma.
html [https://perma.cc/MU5Y-3JK2].
108. See infra notes 173–75 and accompanying text.
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tive explanations for a child’s injuries.109
Most experts suggest that a child be evaluated with both a CT scan and an
MRI because each device serves a separate purpose.110 There are also other
factors that influence when and why medical professionals use these techniques.
CT scans are faster and easier to administer than MRIs, especially in emergency
situations,111 and they are typically performed first, when an infant is admitted
to the hospital.112 CT scans do not require the infant to be still, as MRIs do;113
therefore, an MRI is most useful when performed a day or so after the alleged
injury.114 According to an expert panel of pediatricians specializing in child
abuse, a CT scan is a required procedure during evaluation for brain bleeding
whereas an MRI is only recommended.115 Yet because MRIs can detect abnor-
malities and information that are not well defined by CT scans, infants may
present with normal CT scans but abnormal MRIs.116
109. Patrick D. Barnes & Michael Krasnokutsky, Imaging of the Central Nervous System in
Suspected or Alleged Nonaccidental Injury, Including the Mimics, 18 TOPICS IN MAGNETIC RESONANCE
IMAGING 53, 56, 62–65 (2007); see also I. Blumenthal, Shaken Baby Syndrome, 78 POSTGRADUATE MED.
J. 732, 732–34 (2002) (reviewing the skeletal and eye exams that are administered); Thomas D. Lyon
et al., Medical Evidence of Physical Abuse in Infants and Young Children, 28 PAC. L. J. 93, 102–27,
143, 148–55 (1996) (discussing skeletal X-rays and tests, eye exams, and blood tests); Alexandra R.
Paul & Matthew A. Adamo, Non-Accidental Trauma in Pediatric Patients: A Review of Epidemiology,
Pathophysiology, Diagnosis and Treatment, 3 TRANSLATIONAL PEDIATRICS 195, 199–202 (2014) (noting
the skeletal survey and tests for bleeding disorders and “ocular manifestations” necessary to diagnose
nonaccidental head trauma); Elizabeth E. Gilles, Abusive Head Injury, CHILD NEUROLOGY FOUND.,
http://www.childneurologyfoundation.org/disorders/abusive-head-injury/ [https://perma.cc/2PQB-MFAX]
(describing testing); Healthwise Staff, Shaken Baby Syndrome, EMEDICINEHEALTH (Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.
emedicinehealth.com/shaken_baby_syndrome-health/article_em.htm [https://perma.cc/AM4W-XJKP] (describ-
ing testing). For examples of other injuries that mimic SBS, see infra Section II.D.
110. See Barnes & Krasnokutsky, supra note 109, at 56.
111. Brigitte Chabrol et al., The Role of Cranial MRI in Identifying Patients Suffering from Child
Abuse and Presenting with Unexplained Neurological Findings, 23 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 217, 225
(1999).
112. See K.M. Barlow et al., Magnetic Resonance Imaging in Acute Non-Accidental Head Injury, 88
ACTA PAEDIATRICA 734, 739 (1999).
113. Erica Beecher-Monas & Edgar Garcia-Rill, Overselling Images: fMRI and the Search for Truth,
48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 651, 657 (2015) (explaining that one of the limitations of an MRI relative to
other imaging tests is that “the MRI can secure an image only if the subject being scanned lies
completely still, as any movement can introduce alterations in the image and decrease resolution”);
Comparing Different Types of Imaging, NPS MEDICINEWISE (April 22, 2015), http://www.nps.org.au/
medical-tests/medical-imaging/for-individuals/imaging-compared [https://perma.cc/R99H-HM5W] (not-
ing as a disadvantage of the MRI that “[s]light movement can ruin the image, requiring retesting” and
that “[s]edation or anaesthesia may be required for young children or others who can’t remain still”);
see also Imaging Choices for Children, NPS MEDICINEWISE (May 23, 2013), http://www.nps.org.au/
medical-tests/medical-imaging/for-individuals/imaging-and-children/imaging-choices-for-children [https://
perma.cc/83RK-R9EY] (“MRI does have some disadvantages [relative to a CT]. For example, your
child may need to be sedated or undergo anaesthesia during an MRI, as the procedure can be lengthy
and noisy and your child must remain motionless throughout.”).
114. See Chabrol et al., supra note 111, at 227.
115. Kristine A. Campbell et al., Critical Elements in the Medical Evaluation of Suspected Child
Physical Abuse, 136 PEDIATRICS 35, 41 tbl.2 (2015).
116. Barlow et al., supra note 112, at 739.
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MRIs are able to show more detail regarding the pattern, extent, and timing
of brain injuries,117 and they can better detect and differentiate bleeding of
different ages, which is particularly useful in identifying patterns of abuse.118
For example, SBS cases that present with bleeding of different ages may
suggest multiple shaking incidents, which may conflict with a caretaker’s
account of a single incident resulting in head trauma. However, bleeding of
different ages may also be a result of an ongoing natural disease and is not
necessarily indicative of abuse.119 Therefore, MRIs are increasingly included as
part of the routine investigation when infants present with head trauma.120
B. LINK TO CRIMINALITY
Soon after Guthkelch and Caffey’s research was published, SBS was widely
adopted in the medical community as a clinical diagnosis for head injury
inflicted on infants.121 Caffey also emphasized a medical need to recognize and
curtail the devastating cultural beliefs of the day that led to SBS: the “ordinary,
casual, habitual, customary, repeated shaking of infants” and “[t]he wide prac-
tice of habitual whiplash-shaking for trivial reasons” that justified “a massive
nationwide educational campaign” to inform caretakers of the repercussions to
infant welfare.122 Two decades would pass, however, before that campaign
occurred.123 Meanwhile, SBS research continued but primarily remained within
the confines of medical circles.124
117. Patrick D. Barnes, Ethical Issues in Imaging Nonaccidental Injury: Child Abuse, 13 TOPICS
MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING 85, 89 (2002); Waney Squier, Retino-Dural Hemorrhage of Infancy, in
WILEY ENCYCLOPEDIA OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 2339 (Allan Jamieson & Andre Moenssens eds., 2013).
118. Chabrol et al., supra note 111, at 225. Additionally, injury from shaking most frequently results
in bleeding in the subtemporal region of the brain, which is an area of the brain that is difficult to image
with a CT. See Barlow et al., supra note 112, at 739. An MRI can also be used during autopsy
procedures to precisely direct brain cutting to focal areas of injury to better illuminate the extent of
injury. Id.
119. See Barnes & Krasnokutsky, supra note 109, at 64, 67.
120. See Barlow et al., supra note 112, at 734, 739. Indeed, “MRI has become the standard for such
evaluation in these matters.” Barnes & Krasnokutsky, supra note 109, at 64. Magnetic resonance
spectroscopy imaging (MRSI), an application of the MRI that measures the presence of metabolites that
are broken down in the brain, has also proven to be a useful tool in predicting patient outcomes. See
Gregory S. Aaen et al., Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy Predicts Outcomes for Children with
Nonaccidental Trauma, 125 PEDIATRICS 295, 296, 300, 302 (2010).
121. Ronald Uscinski, The Shaken Baby Syndrome, 9 J. AM. PHYSICIANS & SURGEONS 76, 76 (2004).
122. Caffey, On the Theory and Practice of Shaking Infants, supra note 102, at 168–69; see also
Keith A. Findley et al., Shaken Baby Syndrome, Abusive Head Trauma, and Actual Innocence: Getting
It Right, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 209, 223 (2012) (noting that “shaking was at that time viewed
as benign”); supra note 50 and accompanying text (revealing that about 25%–50% of the population is
not aware of the dangers associated with shaking a baby).
123. See DEBORAH TUERKHEIMER, FLAWED CONVICTIONS: “SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME” AND THE INERTIA OF
INJUSTICE 2 (2014). In her book, Deborah Tuerkheimer discusses the social, medical, and legal problems
associated with SBS. Although her book is a groundbreaking introduction and analysis of the SBS
problem, her selection of legal cases is neither systematic nor methodological (per her admission). See
id. at xiii–xiv. Moreover, the great majority of the thirty-or-so cases Professor Tuerkheimer discusses
are not published, see id., and therefore do not provide official precedent for other cases.
124. Id. at 2.
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The link between SBS and criminality developed gradually. The first SBS
case, that of John Schneider, took place in 1984,125 but it would be one of only
fifteen such appellate cases decided before 1990.126 In sharp contrast, there
would be hundreds more cases in the early 1990s and beyond.127 Indeed, by the
late 1990s, in the legal community, SBS had garnered a substantial level of
“acceptance and enormously widespread popularity, with no real investigation
or even question as to its scientific validity.”128 A constellation of factors
contributed to this status, ranging from the establishment of mandatory-
reporting laws for health care and other professionals129 to the increased use of
clinical medicine in legal cases to a growing presumption that any child’s
unexplained injury was likely to have been inflicted by a culpable adult.130
125. State v. Schneider, No. L-84-214, 1984 WL 3719 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 21, 1984).
126. TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 2.
127. Id.
128. Ronald H. Uscinski, Shaken Baby Syndrome: An Odyssey, 46 NEUROLOGIA MEDICO-CHIRURGICA
57, 58 (2006); see also Waney Squier, The “Shaken Baby” Syndrome: Pathology and Mechanisms, 122
ACTA NEUROPATHOLOGICA 519, 521 (2011) (discussing how “nobody has yet marshaled a coherent and
comprehensive argument in support of shaking as a causal mechanism for abusive head injury” and that
“the consistent and repeated observation that confessed shaking results in stereotypical injuries that are
so frequently encountered in AHT—and which are so extraordinarily rare following accidental/impact
injuries—IS the evidentiary base for shaking” (quoting Mark S. Dias, The Case for Shaking, in CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT: DIAGNOSIS, TREATMENT AND EVIDENCE 364, 364, 370 (Carole Jenny ed., 2011))).
129. All states have a reporting statute requiring certain individuals to report suspected cases of
child abuse to local child protection officials. See Thomas L. Hafemeister, Castles Made of Sand?
Rediscovering Child Abuse and Society’s Response, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 819, 851 (2010). Currently,
medical personnel, teachers, school officials, and social workers are required to report in all fifty states
and the District of Columbia; forty-nine states and the District of Columbia also require reporting by
law enforcement officers. Id. Eighteen states require all citizens to report. Id. at 853–54. Twenty-three
states require reporting to a state’s Department of Social Services (DSS) or a related child protection
agency, twenty-six states and the District of Columbia allow reporting to either the state’s DSS or a law
enforcement agency, and New York requires reporting to a central registry, which forwards the reports
to a local child protection service. Id. at 858. Most states use a “reasonable cause” standard, requiring
reporting when “a reasonable person under similar circumstances” would suspect child abuse. Id. at
854. Model statutory language was developed to encourage individuals to report abuse when they
suspect it, rather than waiting until they believe abuse has occurred, thereby potentially inflating the
number of erroneous reports by lowering the threshold. Id. at 855. Most states’ reporting statutes also
include an immunity provision to protect those who report in “good faith.” Caroline T. Trost, Chilling
Child Abuse Reporting: Rethinking the CAPTA Amendments, 51 VAND. L. REV. 183, 196 (1998). Courts
have interpreted these good-faith provisions to allow immunity for negligent reporting, consistent with
the purpose of encouraging those who are in positions to detect child abuse to “freely report it to
authorities without fear of liability.” See id. at 198 (citation omitted). Seventeen states include a
presumption of good faith in their immunity provisions, but immunity is usually granted whether the
statute indicates a presumption of good faith or not. Id. at 199 & n.94. Upon receiving a report of
suspected abuse, a state’s child protection agency must investigate to determine whether there is
reasonable or probable cause to believe the child has been abused. Id. at 202. Agency workers typically
rely on physicians’ reports because of their expertise in dealing with injuries and their objectivity
regarding the possible perpetrator. Id. If the agency finds that abuse has occurred, the agency will work
with parents to improve their parenting skills. Id. In cases of severe abuse, the agency may petition the
court for custody of the child. Trost, supra, at 202. Law enforcement agents and the criminal justice
system are usually only consulted in cases involving death, serious injury, or sexual abuse. Id.
130. Uscinski, supra note 128, at 57–58.
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Also by this time, the ties between SBS and the requisite elements of a crime
had become firmly entrenched: shaking was the act that caused harm to the
infant; the force with which the baby was shaken indicated the perpetrator’s
mental state, especially intent; and finally, the caretaker who was last with the
conscious baby was the defendant.131 The very term “shaken baby syndrome”
fuels the causal perception of these associations, with its suggestion that there is
a singular origin of the act—“shaking”—and its implication of intent because
shaking a baby is only rarely accidental.132 In other words, the caretaker
presumably fulfills both the actus reus requirement and the mens rea require-
ment. It is highly unusual for a medical syndrome to be identified using terms
that so readily connote wrongdoing; the vast majority of syndromes are named
either by the person who discovered them or by their medical characteristics.133
By 2012, even Guthkelch, the creator of SBS, published an article severely
deriding how the syndrome had been misapplied over the years, particularly as a
vehicle for connoting a caretaker’s intent to harm.134
The initial SBS research proposed that shaking was merely a possible method
by which the triad symptoms could occur and that it was often considered an
acceptable response to a crying infant.135 However, influential medical organiza-
tions took the causal suggestion one step further. In 1992, the National Center
on Child Abuse and Neglect supported a groundbreaking nationwide strategy to
promote awareness of SBS.136 As a result, prosecutors throughout the country
were instructed about the SBS triad symptoms in order to pursue cases.137 A
year later, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the leading U.S. organization of
pediatricians, made statements suggesting that evidence of the triad symptoms
supported a medical presumption of abuse, thereby prompting both doctors and
prosecutors to equate those symptoms with shaking.138
Likewise, in 1998, a number of leading pediatricians who specialized in child
abuse endorsed a published letter to the editor of the journal Pediatrics insisting
that SBS “is now a well-characterized clinical and pathological entity.”139 The
group questioned “those who would challenge the specificity of [the SBS]
131. See TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 5. Because the onset of symptoms would have been
immediate following shaking, the last person with the conscious baby could be identified as the abuser.
See Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Shaken Baby Syndrome: Rotational
Cranial Injuries—Technical Report, 108 PEDIATRICS 206, 207 (2001) [hereinafter Rotational Cranial
Injuries].
132. See A.N. Guthkelch, Problems of Infant Retino-Dural Hemorrhage with Minimal External
Injury, 12 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 202 (2012).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 201–08.
135. Caffey, On the Theory and Practice of Shaking Infants, supra note 102, at 165; see also infra
Section II.D.
136. See Showers, supra note 53, at 358.
137. TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 4.
138. See Comm. on Child Abuse & Neglect, Am. Acad. of Pediatrics, Shaken Baby Syndrome:
Inflicted Cerebral Trauma, 92 PEDIATRICS 872, 872 (1993).
139. Chadwick, supra note 104, at 321.
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diagnostic features” in court by way of suggesting other causes for an infant’s
injury.140 Therefore, by reinforcing the presumption of abuse, the medical
community created a scenario in which presumption of abuse could be treated
as intentionality in the legal context.141 Recent findings and investigation into
the original research, however, have seriously questioned both the scientific and
legal underpinnings of SBS.
C. DOUBTS ABOUT THE SCIENCE
There is a debate in much of the modern literature on SBS concerning
whether the science behind the diagnosis is problematic.142 For example, de-
spite many reported cases of shaken infants, there has not been a single
documented instance in which someone has witnessed shaking alone cause
brain injury in an infant, nor has such damage been replicated in a controlled
laboratory setting.143 Furthermore, no study has shown that human beings are
capable of creating the necessary rotational acceleration through manual shak-
ing to cause brain injuries in infants without impact.144 These and other findings
conflict with Guthkelch’s original hypothesis that manual shaking alone can
manifest in triad symptoms.145
140. Id.
141. See Guthkelch, supra note 132, at 202.
142. Compare TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 5 (criticizing the science) and Findley et al., supra
note 122, at 213 (criticizing the science), with Narang, supra note 23, at 578 (explaining that SBS
(abusive head trauma or AHT) “is the most peer reviewed and well-published topic in child abuse
pediatrics”) and Joe¨lle A. Moreno & Brian Holmgren, Dissent Into Confusion: The Supreme Court,
Denialism, and the False “Scientific” Controversy over Shaken Baby Syndrome, 1 UTAH L. REV. 153,
154–55 (2013) (discussing SBS as “a diagnosis that has been recognized as clinically valid and
evidence-based by an overwhelming majority of pediatric medical specialists for almost half a century,
substantiated by the bulk of the medical research in a range of scientific disciplines, recognized and
defined by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and widely accepted by courts in the United
States and numerous foreign countries”).
143. See Uscinski, supra note 121, at 76–77 (collecting research and relying heavily on research
published by A.K. Ommaya); Waney Squier & Lucy B. Rorke-Adams, The Triad of Retinal Haemor-
rhage, Subdural Haemorrhage and Encephalopathy in an Infant Unassociated with Evidence of
Physical Injury is Not the Result of Shaking, But is Most Likely to Have Been Caused by a Natural
Disease, 3 J. PRIMARY HEALTH CARE 159, 159 (2011) (noting that “in nearly 40 years, no one has ever
witnessed shaking to cause the collapse of a well baby”).
144. See Uscinski, supra note 121, at 77; see also Ann-Christine Duhaime et al., The Shaken Baby
Syndrome: A Clinical, Pathological, and Biomechanical Study, 66 J. NEUROSURGERY 409, 414 (1987);
Michael Thomas Prange et al., Anthropomorphic Simulations of Falls, Shakes, and Inflicted Impacts in
Infants, 99 J. NEUROSURGERY 143, 149 (2003).
145. See Guthkelch, supra note 96, at 430–31. But see Christopher Spencer Greeley, Abusive Head
Trauma: A Review of the Evidence Base, 204 AM. J. ROENTGENOLOGY 967, 970–71 (2015) (discussing
various methods of testing the SBS hypothesis and the merits of each, including animal and biofidelic
research and computer models); Sandeep K. Narang et al., A Daubert Analysis of Abusive Head
Trauma/Shaken Baby Syndrome—Part II: An Examination of the Differential Diagnosis, 13 HOUS.
J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 203, 252 (2013) (noting that “the biomechanical literature does not offer a
definitive ‘yes’ or ‘no’ answer to the widely debated question of whether shaking alone can cause SDHs
[subdural hematomas]. . . . It is clear, however, that continued assertion of the principle—that bio-
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Guthkelch has acknowledged the veracity of this lack of replication, stress-
ing, however, that the particular anatomical vulnerabilities and complexities of
the infant brain are virtually impossible to document and replicate in a labora-
tory setting.146 He suggests that additional research is necessary before any
conclusive statements can be made about the exact cause and mechanism of
subdural hemorrhaging in infants.147 That said, he has also reacted strongly to
how SBS research has been distorted to implicate defendants in the criminal
justice system. For example, he emphasizes that it is erroneous to infer that
shaking or abuse caused an infant’s retino-dural hemorrhage and explicitly
laments “the danger of assuming criminal intent” in the criminal SBS cases.148
As he explains, “both medical science and the law have gone too far in
hypothesizing and criminalizing alleged acts of violence in which the only
evidence has been the presence of the classic triad or even just one or two of its
elements.”149 Likewise, because of the presumed certainty of the syndrome,
some physicians may fail to sufficiently inquire into other causes of the triad,
even when medical reports suggest that the infant may have a significant history
of abnormalities and illnesses.150
Beginning in the mid-1970s, examiners started to use CT scans to help
diagnose SBS.151 By the 1980s, the introduction of MRIs enhanced researchers’
abilities to better detect and define certain kinds and patterns of brain injuries,
as well as the time in which they occurred.152 Although the CT and MRI are
complementary,153 the growing application of MRI has also revealed that the
SBS-triad symptoms could result from accidental injury and medical disorders,
contrary to previous assumptions that the triad symptoms could only be caused
by shaking.154 Consequently, recent research has questioned the physiological
mechanism of rapid acceleration–deceleration forces applying shearing strain to
the bridging veins in the brain.
mechanics clearly demonstrates that [subdural hematomas] and/or serious brain injury cannot result
from shaking—is disingenuous and scientifically irresponsible.”).
146. Guthkelch, supra note 132, at 202–03.
147. Id. at 208.
148. Id. at 203.
149. Id. at 203–04.
150. TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 26. But see Albert et al., supra note 22, at 39 (explaining how
“[p]hysicians treating and studying the pathology of children with these other disorders and diseases
that mimic AHT agree that these disorders and diseases can be diagnosed or ruled out on the basis of
routine diagnostic evaluation and ancillary studies”).
151. Rotational Cranial Injuries, supra note 131, at 206.
152. Id. at 206–08; Barnes & Krasnokutsky, supra note 109, at 56; Squier, supra note 128, at
520–21.
153. Rotational Cranial Injuries, supra note 131, at 207; Barnes & Krasnokutsky, supra note 109, at
56; Kent P. Hymel et al., Intracranial Hemorrhage and Rebleeding in Suspected Victims of Abusive
Head Trauma: Addressing the Forensic Controversies, 7 CHILD MALTREATMENT 329, 344 (2002).
154. See Barnes, supra note 117, at 91; Squier, supra note 128.
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Academic challenges to the SBS diagnosis first emerged in 2001 with the
publication of two articles by Jennian Geddes, a British neuropathologist.155
According to Geddes, bleeding in the brain was more likely to be hypoxic-
ischaemic, meaning due to a shortage of oxygenated blood rather than the result
of physical damage.156 Because a lack of oxygen could occur for many reasons
unrelated to abuse, the premise behind the triad would “require fresh examina-
tion.”157 Thus, Geddes contended that SBS could no longer be used as an
accurate indicator of abuse nor could it be relied on to identify the perpetrator,
as infants may remain conscious for periods of time prior to collapse.158
Additional research in 2001 revealed that short-distance falls of less than three
to four feet could cause triad symptoms, further weakening the link between
triad symptoms and abuse.159 By 2002, the National Institutes of Health held a
conference to discuss such critical findings.160 Although the conference was
confined to SBS supporters, much discussion concerned the dearth of eviden-
tiary support for the diagnosis,161 as a preface to the conference proceedings
made clear: “Because there is very little scientific experimental or descriptive
work [on SBS], the pathophysiology remains obscure, and the relationship to
mechanics even cloudier. . . . What we need is science—research and evidence
that just isn’t there right now.”162
The controversy surrounding SBS in no way invalidates the horrifying fact
that some caregivers do inflict injury or death upon children. Child abuse and
SBS are devastating issues for families and society, and there is no question that
nonaccidental brain trauma in babies is medically diagnosable within the con-
fines of medical practice in a hospital. Yet there is a growing recognition of the
legal problems raised by SBS. The doctors who make and corroborate such
diagnoses are not trained in the forensics of child abuse. Their sole concern is to
immediately treat their patients and to protect them from future harm. There-
fore, these doctors are not capable of determining whether the patient was in
fact criminally abused, let alone whether the alleged abuser intended to cause
155. See J. F. Geddes et al., Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in Children, I. Patterns of Brain
Damage, 124 BRAIN 1290 (2001) [hereinafter Geddes, Patterns of Brain Damage]; J. F. Geddes et al.,
Neuropathology of Inflicted Head Injury in Children, II. Microscopic Brain Injury in Infants, 124 BRAIN
1299 (2001) [hereinafter Geddes, Microscopic Brain Injury in Infants]. For an in-depth critique of
Geddes’s alternative hypothesis, see Narang, supra note 145, at 264–78; Narang, supra note 23, at
562–68.
156. Geddes, Patterns of Brain Damage, supra note 155, at 1295, 1297–98; Geddes, Microscopic
Brain Injury in Infants, supra note 155, at 1303–05.
157. Geddes, Microscopic Brain Injury in Infants, supra note 155, at 1305.
158. TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 24.
159. John Plunkett, Fatal Pediatric Head Injuries Caused by Short-Distance Falls, 22 AM. J.
FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 1, 5, 10 (2001).
160. See AM. ACAD. OF PEDIATRICS, INFLICTED CHILDHOOD NEUROTRAUMA (Robert M. Reece & Carol E.
Nicholson eds., 2003) (publishing the proceedings of the conference).
161. Findley et al., supra note 122, at 234.
162. See Carole E. Nicholson, Preface to INFLICTED CHILDHOOD NEUROTRAUMA, supra note 160, at ix.
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such harm.163 As one neurosurgeon and expert noted, “[w]ith regard to treat-
ment of cranio-cerebral trauma, the differentiation between accidental and
inflicted injury is of limited practical importance: injuries are injuries. For social
purposes, however, the distinction is critical.”164
D. THE UNINTENTIONAL CARETAKER
As the science around SBS becomes more controversial, using the diagnosis
to show criminal intent becomes even more problematic. In fact, the literature
overwhelmingly converges on a similar theme: given the number of natural
diseases, short falls, and slight impacts that can mimic SBS symptoms, it is
erroneous for doctors, medical experts, and subsequently courtrooms to infer
that a defendant intentionally abused an infant based on the presence of
symptoms.165
Reflecting these developments, in 2009 the American Academy of Pediatrics
recommended that pediatricians drop the term SBS, which “implies a single
injury mechanism,” and instead use the term “abusive head trauma,” which
reflects a broader and more varied constellation of head and brain injury.166
Although shaking remains one of the acknowledged causes of “abusive head
trauma,” the Academy now recognizes that the former SBS diagnosis implied
an unrealistic level of certainty and a presumption of abuse.167 As Guthkelch
notes, however, “abusive head trauma” is an imperfect name as well: “abusive”
presupposes intent, and “trauma” presupposes causation.168 To jump to the
conclusion that an infant has been abused, without a more thorough investiga-
tion into the infant’s medical history and possible alternative causes, is to infer
intent prematurely.169
Recognizing such connotations, many physicians now call such a diagnosis
“nonaccidental injury” or “nonaccidental trauma,” terms that presumably dis-
card the intent-laden names of “shaken baby” and “abusive head trauma.”170
Nonetheless, the term “nonaccidental trauma” still suggests wrongdoing be-
cause the possibility that the child’s injury was due to an accident is, by
definition, no longer a viable explanation. It seems this type of harm cannot
avoid a pejorative label. Regardless, this Article continues to refer to “shaken
baby syndrome” because that is the term currently used in most criminal court
163. Findley et al., supra note 122. That said, although doctors are not specifically trained to
determine if a child was criminally abused, they are legally required to report a case even if they only
slightly suspect that there was abuse. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing some of
the reporting statutes and requirements for doctors).
164. Uscinski, supra note 121, at 77.
165. See TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 22; see also Albert et al., supra note 22, at 39–40
(discussing the problems associated with experts testifying about SBS in court).
166. Christian et al., supra note 103, at 1411.
167. Id. at 1410.
168. Guthkelch, supra note 132, at 202.
169. Id. at 202.
170. Barnes & Krasnokutsky, supra note 109, at 53.
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cases.171
Indeed, much of the SBS literature emphasizes the same message: “[C]aretak-
ers . . . ‘may be unaware of the specific injuries they may cause by shaking’”172
and “frustration with a child’s crying is the number one reason a person shakes
a baby.”173 This frustration is often exacerbated by contributing factors such as
a caregiver’s depression, anxiety, and fatigue174 as well as the “‘developmental
curve’ of increased crying” that peaks in babies at ages two or three months.175
Indeed, many caretakers simply want the baby to comply with their wishes.176
Likewise, infant abusive head injuries frequently occur when the caretaker is
inexperienced around children.177 Some shakers claim that shaking successfully
stopped a child’s cries in the past without any visible repercussions.178
In these cases, the shaking may be a repeated occurrence rather than a
single, isolated event179 as research on confessed shaking offenders has
171. See, e.g., supra note 97 and infra note 292 (discussing the ongoing “shaken baby syndrome”
case of Robert Roberson and illustrating the continuing use of the terminology).
172. Showers, supra note 53, at 353 (citations omitted).
173. Shaken Baby Syndrome (SBS), NAT’L CTR. ON SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME, http://purplecrying.info/
sub-pages/protecting/shaken-baby-syndrome-sbs.php [https://perma.cc/Q9PZ-QRSN]; see also Ronald
G. Barr et al., Maternal Frustration, Emotional and Behavioural Responses to Prolonged Infant
Crying, 37 INFANT BEHAV. & DEV. 652, 652 (2014) (emphasizing that “[p]rolonged inconsolable crying
bouts in the first months of life are frustrating to parents and may lead to abuse”).
174. E-mail from Ronald G. Barr, Emeritus Professor of Pediatrics, Univ. of B.C., to Marisa
McPeck-Stringham, Info. and Research Specialist, Nat’l Ctr. on Shaken Baby Syndrome (Feb. 10,
2016, 5:45 PM) (on file with author) [hereinafter Barr E-mail].
175. Id. (“In brief, there is a ‘positive feedback’ cycle that occurs only with shaking as a response,
and not with other responses. This contributes to the repeated shaking phenomenon.”).
176. Showers, supra note 53, at 353. This situation is especially problematic when doctors,
prosecutors, juries, and others infer mens rea from victims’ injuries, thereby adding to the perfect storm.
177. Mary E. Case et al., Nat’l Ass’n of Med. Examiners Ad Hoc Comm. on Shaken Baby
Syndrome, Position Paper on Fatal Abusive Head Injuries in Infants and Young Children, 22 AM. J.
FORENSIC MED. & PATHOLOGY 112, 113 (2001). For research on the risk factors associated with abusive
head trauma (SBS), see Greeley, supra note 145, at 968 (“Maternal characteristics associated with
increased risk of perpetrating AHT include age younger than 21 years and being unmarried. Children
living in households with unrelated adults, compared with a home with two biologic parents, are at
50-fold increased risk of dying of inflicted injuries. Maternal undereducation (12 years), maternal age
younger than 15 years, and lack of prenatal care have been identified as risk factors for infant homicide,
battering being the most common cause. A survey of parents in The Netherlands showed that 5.6% of
parents indicated that they smothered, slapped, or shook their infants because of their crying. A survey
in North and South Carolina showed that 2.6% of parents reported shaking their children younger than
2 years as a method of discipline. Perpetrators of AHT are more than twice as often men. Fathers are
the most common perpetrators of AHT overall, followed by mothers’ boyfriends and female babysit-
ters.”).
178. Greeley, supra note 145, at 968.
179. Barr E-mail, supra note 174; see also Catherine Adamsbaum et al., Abusive Head Trauma:
Judicial Admissions Highlight Violent and Repetitive Shaking, 126 PEDIATRICS 546 (2010). Catherine
Adamsbaum, M.D. and her colleagues conducted perhaps the seminal study on the caregiver–infant
interaction that results in violent and repetitive shaking. The objective of the study was to “correlate
legal statements by [confessed SBS] perpetrators with medical documentation [brain scans] to offer
insights into the mechanism of injury.” Id. at 546. In twenty-nine of the cases examined in the study,
detailed confessions were given, which is a rarity in these types of crimes. Id. at 547–48.
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shown.180 Educating parents about the dangers of shaking has been a highly
effective strategy in curtailing such abuse.181
Guthkelch himself further complicated the problems by inferring criminal
intent. In his original research, he wrongly attributed SBS symptoms in two
infants: one who had been gently shaken by his mother during a coughing fit
when she feared he was going to choke and one whose “mother admitted she
and her husband ‘might have’ shaken the baby when he cried at night.”182 He
notes too that Caffey had presented a case in which a mother jerked her child in
the process of grabbing his arm to prevent him from falling off of a table.183
Although the circumstances in these three cases seemingly produced a subdural
hemorrhage or further hemorrhaging, none of them involved any kind of violent
shaking or “any apparent malicious intent.”184 Therefore, it is incorrect for
courts to infer intent from the mere presence of triad symptoms, as it is evident
that triad symptoms can occur without violent shaking.185 As one article empha-
sizes in the context of more modern measurements of infant brain trauma, “[t]he
medical and imaging findings cannot diagnose intentional injury.”186 Wrong
diagnoses not only create disastrous consequences for the accused, but they may
also thwart an infant’s chances of receiving necessary medical attention if
medical professionals overlook natural disease causes in favor of the presump-
tion of abuse.187
Researchers now recognize that numerous conditions can mimic SBS, includ-
ing congenital malformations, metabolic or genetic disorders, hematological
disorders, infectious diseases, autoimmune conditions, aneurysms, strokes, and
chain reactions to cardiorespiratory arrest, hypoxia, resuscitation, and sei-
zures.188 As radiological imaging improves, even more infants are found to have
subdural hemorrhages following birth that are not associated with any abuse
whatsoever.189 Guthkelch points to one study that reported 46% of asymptom-
atic infants had subdural hemorrhages following a normal birth; for symptom-
atic infants with difficult births or congenital diseases, the percentage is likely
180. Adamsbaum et al., supra note 179, at 546. According to Adamsbaum’s study, in over 50% of
the reviewed SBS cases, the shaking in response to crying was recurrent. Id. at 550, 553.
181. See Showers, supra note 53, at 349, 356–59 (detailing successful prevention programs).
182. Guthkelch, supra note 132, at 205–06.
183. Id. at 205.
184. Id. at 205–06.
185. See id.
186. Barnes & Krasnokutsky, supra note 109, at 71.
187. See Guthkelch, supra note 132, at 206.
188. Barnes & Krasnokutsky, supra note 109, at 53–71; Hymel et al., supra note 153, at 332;
Katherine Judson, What Child Welfare Attorneys Need to Know About Shaken Baby Syndrome, 17
CHILD. RTS. LITIG. 9, 10 (2015); Narang, supra note 145, at 229 (opining that “[b]leeding disorders may
be proposed as the underlying cause for clinical findings in cases of suspected abusive head trauma”);
Andrew P. Sirotnak, Medical Disorders That Mimic Abusive Head Trauma, in ABUSIVE HEAD TRAUMA IN
INFANTS AND CHILDREN: A MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND FORENSIC REFERENCE 191, 193–214 (Lori D. Frasier et al.
eds., 2006).
189. Guthkelch, supra note 132, at 206.
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significantly higher.190 Although most subdural bleeds resolve themselves, in-
fants who do not improve are more likely to have a pre-existing condition that
may result in more brain hemorrhaging.191 Research on the causes and mecha-
nisms of subdural hemorrhaging is still developing, but much of what previ-
ously had been accepted as fact is now being called into question.192 It is
increasingly difficult to justify deciphering the state of mind of an alleged
abuser on the basis of such controversial research.
Nonetheless, my Neuroscience Study reveals that this approach is astonish-
ingly successful. Courts are surprisingly receptive to the prosecution’s efforts,
notwithstanding weaknesses in the underlying science. SBS cases illustrate a
disturbing phenomenon in which the crucial element of mens rea is either
muddled or missing altogether in the crime that has been charged, yet prosecu-
tors are effectively—and without objection from the defense—concocting intent
out of victim neuroscience evidence that is admitted for solely medical pur-
poses. My Study shows prosecutorial exploitation of victim neuroscience evi-
dence, with SBS cases representing a perfect storm of the legal and scientific
factors that lead to such a strategy.
III. SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME AS A MICROCOSM OF SCIENTIFIC MISUSE
This Part discusses individual case studies derived from my Neuroscience
Study to illustrate how the victim neuroscience cases follow a paradigm in
which the State relies heavily—if not entirely—on two key pieces of evidence:
the science of SBS and the testimony of medical expert witnesses explaining
that science.193 This reliance is all the more troubling in light of Part II’s
overview of the scientific weaknesses of SBS. In addition, much of the medical
and legal literature agrees that SBS should not be introduced in the courtroom in
the ways this Part’s case studies demonstrate, most particularly as evidence of
the defendant’s mens rea at the time of a crime. Problems arise when a
diagnosis such as “nonaccidental trauma,” made for the purpose of medical care
and treatment, is transformed in a courtroom to a diagnosis of “shaken baby
syndrome” or “abusive head trauma” and introduced for the purpose of criminal
prosecution.194
Three key interrelated factors distinguish this Part’s cases from other kinds of
criminal cases: (1) the prosecution depends almost entirely on the medical
190. Id.; V.J. Rooks et al., Prevalence and Evolution of Intracranial Hemorrhage in Asymptomatic
Term Infants, 29 AM. J. NEURORADIOLOGY 1082, 1083, 1085 (2008); see also Narang, supra note 145, at
231 (“There are many . . . congenital bleeding disorders, and significant variability exists in the
prevalence and presenting symptoms of each of the bleeding disorders, such that each disorder must be
considered individually.”).
191. Guthkelch, supra note 132, at 206.
192. Rooks et al., supra note 190, at 1085–86.
193. See TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 5 (describing a similar type of prosecutorial paradigm).
194. Albert et al., supra note 22, at 39 (noting that “some cases may have an unexpected outcome
that contradicts what an objective view of the science and facts would otherwise dictate”).
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diagnosis of SBS for its theory and argument, without which there would most
likely be no case or, at most, a case involving a substantially lesser charge; (2)
the prosecution focuses on proving, however dubiously, that the defendant
intended his or her actions, as opposed to a lower level of mens rea such as
recklessness, despite no direct evidence of intentionality; and (3) the prosecu-
tion emphasizes a causal connection between the defendant’s mens rea and
actus reus, which suggests that the defendant was aware that the actions he or
she engaged in would cause the victim’s harm. As a result, for many cases
involving SBS, courts convict defendants for the most serious offenses, and
those defendants receive the harshest punishments.
A. INTENT IS “IN THE AIR”195
This Section examines, from the Neuroscience Study’s pool of 286 victim-
neuroscience evidence cases,196 a select number of case studies focusing in
particular on the three interrelated factors mentioned above. These case studies
are exemplary in the sense that they demonstrate the problems with SBS in a
variety of scenarios particularly well.
In State v. Rodriguez, for example, the defendant was convicted of first-
degree felony murder in the death of his 5-month-old son, Louie.197 At trial, the
prosecution introduced a CT scan of Louie’s brain, which “revealed significant
blood around the surface of [his] brain and extreme swelling of the brain
itself.”198 The prosecution also offered testimony from three physicians who
had treated Louie and whose testimony substantially swayed the appellate court.
One doctor testified that she believed “vigorous shaking had caused Louie’s
injuries, which were consistent with ‘nonaccidental trauma.’”199 The second
doctor concluded that the “massively swollen” nature of Louie’s brain was “the
result of ‘intentionally inflicted head trauma.’”200 The third doctor determined
that Louie’s injuries were “consistent with ‘shaken baby nonaccidental
trauma.’”201
The defense called only one expert, a pathologist and toxicologist who
concluded that Louie’s death was caused by whooping cough based on his
review of Louie’s medical history and hospital records.202 On appeal, the
defendant’s principal argument was that the district court erred by failing to
instruct the jury on several lesser included charges, including reckless second-
195. This subtitle is a play on words from a famous quote, “negligence [is] in the air.” See Palsgraf
v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928).
196. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (describing the breakdown between defendant
neuroscience cases and victim neuroscience cases).
197. 289 P.3d 85, 89 (Kan. 2012).
198. Id.
199. Id. at 90.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 90.
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degree murder and reckless involuntary manslaughter.203 The court rejected this
argument, reasoning that not only was the father Louie’s sole caretaker at the
time Louie became injured, but also that the three examining physicians “were
united in their opinions that [Louie’s] injuries were intentionally inflicted.”204
The court concluded that “[t]he evidence was not that Louie’s injuries were
simply the result of trauma, perhaps recklessly inflicted, but rather that the
injuries were the result of intentionally inflicted trauma.”205 Yet Rodriguez is a
case in which medical testimony about Louie’s ill health was substantial—not
only was Louie sickly throughout much of his short life, but the father-caretaker
called 911 immediately when there was a problem, and there was no indication
that he had inflicted any other kind of injury.206 Without the medical testimony
of nonaccidental trauma, it is unclear what charge, if any, the father would have
faced.
Rodriguez illustrates the propensity for courts to accept a prosecution’s
pervasive reliance on expert testimony and brain scans in interpretations of a
defendant’s mental state. Likewise, in Roark v. State, the defendant was con-
victed of injury to a child, B.D., and sentenced to thirty-five years in prison.207
At trial, the prosecution introduced a CT scan of B.D.’s brain and medical
testimony interpreting the scan. Dr. Kathleen Murphy, a pediatric intensivist,
testified that B.D.’s CT scan revealed “a subdural hemorrhage, which involves
bleeding around the brain in the space between the brain and the cranium.”208
Dr. Murphy believed this brain damage was caused by a “closed head injury,”
which was likely nonaccidental.209 She further opined that “the type of force
needed to cause an injury like B.D.’s would be comparable to a motor vehicle
accident, a high-speed bicycle accident without a helmet . . . or a non-accidental
trauma where the child is shaken or hit against a wall or some object.”210
Similarly, Dr. Nancy Rollins, a pediatric neuroradiologist, testified that B.D.’s
CT scan revealed neurological abnormalities, such as “brain swelling, [and]
blood over the brain.”211 She concluded that B.D. “had undergone non-
accidental trauma, child abuse” and that B.D.’s injuries “were consistent with
203. Rodriguez, 289 P.3d at 91.
204. Id. at 92.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 89–90.
207. No. 05-00-00584-CR, 2001 WL 1173916, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2001).
208. Id. at *3.
209. Id. A “closed head injury” is defined as “a trauma in which the brain is injured as a result of a
blow to the head, or a sudden, violent motion that causes the brain to knock against the skull.” Closed
Head Injury, BRAINANDSPINALCORD.ORG, http://www.brainandspinalcord.org/traumatic-brain-injury-types/
closed-brain-injury/index.html [https://perma.cc/X3WZ-LERL]. Such an injury is different than “an
open head injury, in that no object actually penetrates the brain.” Id. Closed head injuries have the
potential to be “diffuse,” in the sense “that they affect cells and tissues throughout the brain; or focal,
meaning that the damage occurs in one area.” Id.
210. Roark, 2001 WL 1173916, at *3.
211. Id. at *4.
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the type of violent injury known as [SBS].”212
On appeal, the defendant’s primary argument was that the evidence at trial
was legally insufficient to support his conviction for injury to a child because
the State did not prove that the defendant “(1) knowingly or intentionally
caused serious bodily injury to B.D., (2) caused the injuries to B.D., or (3)
shook or struck B.D. against an object as alleged in the indictment.”213 The
appellate court rejected these arguments because of the victim neuroscience
evidence in the record that supported conviction. Based on the expert testimony
and testing, the court determined that a rational jury “could infer appellant
knowingly or intentionally caused serious bodily injury by shaking B.D.” and
thereby “conclude[d] the evidence [was] legally sufficient to support [Roark’s]
conviction for injury to a child.”214 Similar to Rodriguez, the prosecution’s
arguments in Roark rested heavily on its experts’ characterization of SBS as
well as the defense’s decision not to introduce experts to criticize the SBS
diagnosis.
B. THE CAUSAL DISCONNECT BETWEEN MENS REA AND ACTUS REUS
In State v. Hales, the court’s focus on the defendant’s level of intent was even
more pronounced, particularly as it applied to the defendant’s acts. In Hales, the
defendant was convicted of murder and sentenced to five years to life in
prison.215 The facts are unusual because the defendant was alleged to have
fatally injured the victim, Luther, on December 5, 1985, when Luther was five
months old; however, Luther did not die until he was twelve years old (from
complications attributed to severe brain injuries that he experienced at five
months).216 At the preliminary hearing and at trial, the prosecution presented
several CT scans of Luther’s brain taken across a span of three years, illustrat-
ing a progressive worsening of its condition.217
Based on the CT scans and other medical evidence regarding retinal hemor-
rhaging, Dr. Marion Walker, a pediatric neurosurgeon, testified that the injury to
Luther must have been nonaccidental and caused by SBS.218 Dr. Walker ex-
plained that “the ‘constellation of injuries’ clinically associated with [SBS] is
212. Id.
213. Id. at *1.
214. Id. at *4.
215. 152 P.3d 321, 329 (Utah 2007).
216. Id. at 324–25.
217. See id. at 339 (“[T]he first CT scan, which was taken on December 5, 1985, showed initial
signs of edema and bleeding over the surface and between the hemispheres of the brain (or ‘subarach-
noid hemorrhaging’); the CT scans taken on December 8, 1985, and December 11, 1985, showed ‘black
brain,’ evidencing global injury caused by something like lack of blood flow and oxygen (or ‘hypoxia-
ischemia’), which injured the brain throughout; the CT scan from December 8, 1985, showed that the
degree of injury to the front and the back of the brain differed, indicating that arteries had been
occluded by swelling; and finally, a CT scan taken three years later, on December 13, 1988, showed a
shrunken brain evidencing severe loss of functions.”).
218. Id. at 329, 340.
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indicated by ‘a brain scan that actually looks quite similar to what we’ve seen
here today.’”219 Dr. Walker added that “the force required to cause these injuries
to a baby’s brain from shaking would be violent force” and that the injuries
“would have caused immediate unconsciousness with no possibility of a ‘lucid
interval.’”220
The defense called a forensic pathologist at trial, Dr. John Plunkett, who
testified that shaking can injure the neck but not the brain, and thus “the most
likely cause of [Luther’s] injuries was . . . impact from [an earlier] near-miss car
accident that caused the bruising followed by a lengthy ‘lucid interval.’”221 In
addition, there were no other signs of injury apart from the bruise; the SBS
diagnosis was the only kind of circumstantial evidence available.222
On appeal, the defendant argued that the evidence did not show he possessed
the mental state necessary for a murder conviction,223 an argument the court
rejected. As the court explained, Luther’s injuries comprised “the key circumstan-
tial evidence as to [defendant’s] mental state.”224 Based on the CT scans, for
example, Dr. Walker had testified that Luther’s “massive brain injury” was
“caused by shaken baby syndrome” and “by ‘violent force.’”225 In addition,
testimony by Luther’s mother indicated that Luther “was fine” when she put
him in his bed for the night but must have been injured during the twenty to
thirty minutes that the defendant was with him.226 Therefore, altogether, the
jury could infer through “logic and reasonable human experience” that the
defendant’s act of “violently shaking” Luther “created a grave risk of death to
Luther and . . . resulted in Luther’s death” and that the defendant “knew his
conduct presented a grave risk of death to Luther, and that the circumstances
evidenced depraved indifference to human life.”227
Such a conclusion did not rest on the defendant’s level of awareness of SBS;
rather, the court assumed that “reasonable human experience indicates that an
adult would know that violently shaking a five-month-old baby with less-
developed neck control presents a grave risk of death to the baby.”228 As this
Article’s discussion in Part II indicates, however, the court has little to no basis
for linking together such a causal connection between the defendant’s mens rea
and actus reus. First and foremost, there is no direct evidence that the defendant
219. Id. at 340.
220. Id. at 329.
221. Hales, 152 P.3d at 329.
222. See id. at 326.
223. Id. at 336.
224. Id. at 336–37. The defendant’s conviction was overturned on other grounds. Specifically, the
court held that “Hales’s trial attorneys failed to provide effective assistance of counsel because they did
not hire a qualified expert to give an independent interpretation of the CT scans of Luther’s brain
injuries” and that “Hales was prejudiced by this failure.” Id. at 344.
225. Id. at 337.
226. Hales, 152 P.3d at 337.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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ever injured Luther.229 But, even if the defendant did commit the act, there is no
basis for the court’s presumption that the defendant would be aware of Luther’s
particular vulnerability or that the shaking would cause such an injury. Indeed,
the overwhelming literature suggests just the opposite.230
In People v. Wade, the court similarly presumed that the defendant would
understand the extent of the victim’s physical vulnerability if in fact the
defendant had inflicted an injury.231 In Wade, the defendant was convicted of
involuntary manslaughter and “assault on a child under eight years of age by
means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to cause great bodily
injury and that did cause death.”232 At trial, the prosecution introduced CT scans
of the eighteen-month-old victim’s (Koby) brain and the testimony of nine
medical experts who interpreted the scans and conducted medical examina-
tions.233 Dr. Mark Wagner, an emergency room physician, testified that a CT
scan of Koby’s brain revealed “‘massive bleeding about the right frontal
parietal’ portion of the head from the forehead to the back of the head.”234 He
added that “Koby’s brain was swollen, especially on the right side, and his brain
‘was shifting from the right to the left’ due to the ‘[s]welling, blood, and
edema.’”235 He opined that Koby’s injuries were “consistent with ‘shaken baby
syndrome,’” which “occurs when a young child is ‘shaken back and forth
vigorously over and over.’”236
Similarly, Dr. Hosam Moustafa, a pediatric radiologist, reviewed the CT scan
and “noted a large subdural hemorrhage in the right cerebral hemisphere, brain
edema (bleeding), ‘midline shift,’ and areas of brain contusions (bruising).”237
According to Dr. Moustafa, Koby’s “hemorrhage was ‘acute,’ meaning it had
happened within two or three days of the CAT scan”238 and his injuries were
“‘high impact,’” suggesting that “they could have been caused by [SBS] or
similar trauma such as a car accident.”239 Additionally, Dr. Robert Clark, a
pediatric ophthalmologist, testified that “Koby’s injuries were too severe to have
been caused by a fall or other ‘everyday’ type of accident.”240
The defendant, however, was at a severe disadvantage. Although the appel-
late court noted he introduced “significant medical evidence in his defense case
challenging the prosecution’s medical evidence,” the court did not address the
229. See id. at 326.
230. See supra Section II.D (discussing the unintentional caretaker).
231. No. B227026, 2011 WL 5997023, at *6 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2011).
232. Id. at *1.
233. Id. at *1–6.
234. Id. at *2.
235. Id.
236. Id. at *3.
237. Wade, 2011 WL 5997023, at *4.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
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specifics of this evidence for procedural reasons.241 The court explained that
“the substantial evidence standard of review requires us to examine the evi-
dence in a light favoring the jury’s verdict” and thus “the defense’s medical
evidence is of secondary importance for purposes of the substantial evidence
test.”242 Of course, such a dismissal of defendant’s medical evidence challeng-
ing the prosecution’s theory was highly detrimental, especially in a case involv-
ing SBS.
On appeal, the defendant argued that his assault conviction must be reversed
because it was not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, he argued
that “the record d[id] not disclose sufficient evidence supporting the jury’s
[required] finding that a reasonable person would have understood that the
physical force he used on Koby would be likely to cause great bodily injury.”243
The court rejected this argument, finding that the evidence established that the
victim died from SBS and that “a reasonable trier of fact could have found, as it
did, that a reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position would understand that
the physical force he used on Koby was likely to cause great bodily injury.”244
These case studies provide examples of some of the prosecution’s arguments
and themes in the Neuroscience Study’s victim-case database. Yet the case
studies also demonstrate how inadequately defense attorneys represent their
SBS clients. My Neuroscience Study reveals, for example, that of the 280 cases
where the prosecutor introduced victim neuroscience evidence, there was not a
single case in which the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court should
have excluded that evidence.245 It seems that this evidence is uniformly admit-
ted by the courts without any objection from the defense.246 This is an extraordi-
nary finding for two reasons: (1) brain scans and accompanying expert testimony
wield enormous influence in cases involving SBS, especially when it comes to
proving a defendant’s intent;247 and (2) over time, the diagnosis of SBS has
become mired in heated debate.248
C. THE GROWING PUSH FOR THE “JUST AND RIGHT RESULT”
The deficiencies in the SBS strategy are becoming increasingly apparent. In
its groundbreaking report on neuroscience and the law, The Royal Society
included as one of its “key legal issues” a discussion of SBS, noting that SBS
has “immediate relevance” due to the controversy surrounding the science and
disagreement among the medical expert witnesses who explain SBS to juries.249
241. Id. at *2 n.2.
242. Id.
243. Wade, 2011 WL 5997023, at *2.
244. Id. at *6.
245. See App., supra note 80, at XIII.A.
246. See infra Part IV.
247. See supra Section II.A (noting that brain scans and accompanying expert testimony are
commonly the only types of evidence available in modern diagnoses of SBS).
248. See supra Part II.
249. See ROYAL SOC’Y, BRAIN WAVES MODULE 4: NEUROSCIENCE AND THE LAW 19, 30–32 (2011).
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The report concluded with a call for more research in this area so that a greater
consensus could be achieved, thus enabling courts to finally reach “the right and
just result” in SBS cases.250 This Part concludes with a discussion of two such
cases.
1. The U.S. Supreme Court’s Push
In 2011, three Supreme Court Justices recognized the shaky science behind
SBS in Cavazos v. Smith, the only Supreme Court case among the Neuroscience
Study’s 286 victim neuroscience cases.251 In Cavazos, the defendant was con-
victed of assault on a child resulting in death and was sentenced to fifteen years
to life in prison.252 The conviction stemmed from an incident on November 29,
1996, in which the defendant was alleged to have vigorously shaken her
grandson, seven-week-old Etzel Glass, resulting in his death.253 At trial, each of
the prosecution’s three experts testified that Etzel died from SBS.”254 In con-
trast, one of the defendant’s experts contended that Etzel died from Sudden
Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS), while the other stated he died from brain
trauma that was not the result of SBS.255 On appeal, the defendant contended
that there was insufficient evidence to support her conviction,256 an argument
that the California Court of Appeals rejected. According to the court, the jury
was appropriately tasked with resolving any conflicts between expert witnesses
and there was “substantial and sufficient” evidence to support its conclusions.257
The defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United
States District Court for the Central District of California in which she claimed
yet again that there was not sufficient evidence to link Etzel’s death to SBS.258
The district court denied the petition, but the Ninth Circuit reversed,259 determin-
ing that there was “no evidence to permit an expert conclusion one way or the
other” on the cause of Etzel’s death; the Ninth Circuit stressed that there was
“no physical evidence of . . . tearing or shearing, and no other evidence support-
ing death by violent shaking.”260 Instead, the State’s experts “reached [their]
conclusion because there was no evidence in the brain itself of the cause of
250. Id. at 31–32.
251. See 132 S. Ct. 2, 8 (2011).
252. Id. at 4–5.
253. Id. at 4.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 5. SIDS is “the sudden death of an infant less than 1 year of age that cannot be explained
after a thorough investigation is conducted, including a complete autopsy, examination of the death
scene, and a review of the clinical history.” About SUID and SIDS, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/sids/aboutsuidandsids.htm [https://perma.cc/Q55W-Y76Z]. It is also
“the leading cause of death in infants 1 to 12 months old.” Id.
256. Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. at 5.
257. Id. at 5–6.
258. Id. at 6.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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death.”261 Because “[a]bsence of evidence cannot constitute proof beyond a
reasonable doubt,” the Ninth Circuit determined that the California Court of
Appeal had “unreasonably applied” the Supreme Court’s opinion in Jackson v.
Virginia262 when it upheld Smith’s conviction.263
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding that the
California Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Jackson when it found
that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that Etzel died
from SBS.264 Yet it is the dissent, written by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and
joined by Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor, that is particularly
notable because it highlights the controversy surrounding SBS.265 Justice Gins-
burg explained that in the years following the defendant’s 1997 trial, there has
been growing cause to question medical testimony regarding SBS.266 Specifi-
cally, Justice Ginsburg emphasized the medical community’s concerns about
“whether infants can be fatally injured through shaking alone,” noting that “it is
unlikely that the prosecution’s experts [in Cavazos] would today testify as
adamantly as they did in 1997” because “[r]ecent scientific opinion undermines
[much of their] testimony.”267 This new research was “worthy of considerable
weight in the discretionary decision whether to take up this tragic case.”268
Although Justice Ginsburg’s assertions are compelling, especially in light of the
weak science behind SBS, it is also crucial to note that some scholars have
roundly criticized her conclusions.269
Cavazos highlights the problems with overturning an SBS conviction based
on a sufficiency of the evidence claim. At the time of trial, the scientific
underpinnings of SBS were not in question, whereas at the time of appellate
review they were hotly contested.270 It is beyond the scope of this Article to
delve into these problems further, which of course also apply to other types of
261. Id. (emphasis added).
262. 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1979) (“We hold that in a challenge to a state criminal conviction brought
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254—if the settled procedural prerequisites for such a claim have otherwise been
satisfied—the applicant is entitled to habeas corpus relief if it is found that upon the record evidence
adduced at the trial no rational trier of fact could have found proof of guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
263. Cavazos, 132 S. Ct. at 6.
264. Id. at 6–7.
265. Id. at 10–11 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
266. Id. at 10.
267. Id. at 10–11.
268. Id. at 11.
269. See Moreno & Holmgren, supra note 142, at 156, 162 (“Ignoring the overwhelming medical
evidence, the [minority] [J]ustices support their opinion with single-sentence quotations from seven
cherry-picked [methodologically flawed] sources. . . . [T]he Smith dissent reveals how courts carelessly
or inadvertently rely on pseudoscientific information resoundingly rejected within multiple scientific
fields.”).
270. Id. at 162.
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neuroscience evidence.271 Nonetheless, such challenges point to the special
evidentiary frailties concerning changes in scientific opinion over time.
2. The Evidentiary Push
Cavazos may also provide an impetus for lower courts to begin closer
scrutiny of SBS evidence. Indeed, my Neuroscience Study research suggests
that SBS evidence remains a controversial form of victim neuroscience evi-
dence among the lower courts.272 Of the eleven cases (3.85%) in my Neurosci-
ence Study involving challenges to the reliability of victim neuroscience
evidence273 under either Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.274 or
Frye v. United States,275 nine cases (81.82%) focused on SBS evidence,276 with
the earliest of those nine occurring in 2003.277 Yet challenges to SBS evidence
are consistently resolved in the prosecution’s favor.278 It seems that appellate
courts still reject the notion that medical opinions regarding SBS are not
generally accepted in the medical community or that they are not based on
reliable scientific methods.279
Cases in the Neuroscience Study’s database are illustrative. In Common-
wealth v. Martin, for example, a Kentucky trial court held that expert medical
271. See Denno, supra note 37, at 69–71 (discussing the problems with interpreting brain scan
evidence that is a decade or two old in long-running death penalty appeals).
272. See supra Section III.A.
273. See App., supra note 80, at XII.A (dividing 11 by 286).
274. 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (“‘General acceptance’ [the adopted standard under Frye] is not a
necessary precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence,
but the Rules of Evidence—especially Rule 702—do assign to the trial judge the task of ensuring that
an expert’s testimony both rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. Pertinent
evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy those demands.”).
275. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (“Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the
line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight
zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in
the particular field in which it belongs.”); see also Frye Standard, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.
cornell.edu/wex/frye_standard [https://perma.cc/N8TC-3MGJ] (“A court applying the Frye standard
must determine whether or not the method by which that evidence was obtained was generally accepted
by experts in the particular field in which it belongs.”).
276. See App., supra note 80, at XII.B (dividing 9 by 11). Ten of these cases involved a defendant’s
appeal, and one case involved a State’s appeal. See id. at XII.A and cases cited therein.
277. Id. at XII.B.
278. See id. As Tuerkheimer also points out, “defense motions to exclude the prosecution’s expert
testimony” regarding SBS almost uniformly fail. TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 202. “In cases
involving triad symptoms alone, courts continue to reject arguments that the proffered [medical]
opinions are not generally accepted in the medical community, or that they are not based on reliable
scientific methods.” Id.
279. See App., supra note 80, at XII.B. Tuerkheimer makes this observation as well. See TUERKHEIMER,
supra note 123, at 202. For a general discussion of this issue, see Mary Sue Henifin et al., Reference
Guide on Medical Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 439, 441 (Fed. Judicial Ctr.
ed., 2d ed. 2000) (“Testimony by physicians is one of the most common forms of expert testimony in
the courtroom today. Medical testimony is routinely offered in both civil and criminal cases . . . .”).
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testimony regarding SBS was unreliable and therefore inadmissible under
Daubert.280 The court observed that “the most damning studies supporting SBS
are the ones that failed to follow the scientific method,” while studies that
“utilize a more scientific methodology . . . appear to support the conclusion that
the subdural hematoma and bilateral ocular bleeding are not caused by shaking
alone, but require blunt force impact.”281 The court further noted that “[t]o
allow a physician to diagnose SBS with only the two classical markers, and no
other evidence of manifest injuries, is to allow a physician to diagnose a legal
conclusion.”282 The Martin trial court therefore recognized the core concern
with SBS. On the other hand, it also held that additional information could tip
the balance toward acceptability: “If the physician has the two classical markers
(subdural hematoma and bilateral ocular bleeding) coupled with other manifest
injuries, then the diagnosis arises to more than a legal conclusion—it becomes a
medical opinion.”283 Overall, the court concluded that “the clinical medical and
scientific research communities are in disagreement as to whether it is possible
to determine if a given head injury is due to an accident or abuse.”284
Regardless of such an astute analysis, however, the trial court in Martin was
overruled on appeal.285 According to the appellate court, Daubert does not give
courts the power to usurp a jury’s witness credibility determinations.286 Simply
because two qualified experts disagree or propose conflicting opinions based on
the same information or data does not suggest that, under Daubert, a trial court
could strike one expert’s opinion over the other.287 This is not the role of the
judge’s “gatekeeping function”288 and taking such an approach would assume
the jury’s responsibility.289 As the court explained, “[v]igorous cross-examina-
tion, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of
proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admis-
280. 290 S.W.3d 59, 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008). Martin is the only case in the Neuroscience Study in
which the prosecution appealed a trial court’s decision to exclude prosecution victim neuroscience
evidence. This outcome is likely due to the nature of the Neuroscience Study’s cases. Indeed, there are
only seventeen cases (5.94%) in the Study involving any type of appeal by a state or the federal
government. See App., supra note 80, at XIV. In most of these cases, the prosecution was appealing an
intermediary court’s decision to reverse the defendant’s conviction or to modify the defendant’s
sentence. See id. Martin was the only case where the State appealed an evidentiary ruling made by a
trial court. See 290 S.W.3d. at 59. However, if trial courts were routinely excluding prosecution victim
neuroscience evidence, one would expect to find many cases where the prosecution appealed these
decisions. That only one such case exists is another strong indication that trial courts admit prosecution
victim neuroscience evidence routinely and without controversy from defense counsel. See App., supra
note 80, at XII.B.
281. Martin, 290 S.W.3d at 64.
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 69.
286. Id. at 67–68.
287. Martin, 290 S.W.3d at 67–68.
288. Id. at 68.
289. Id.
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sible evidence.”290
Despite the availability of these opportunities in theory, however, my Neuro-
science Study shows that defendants are rarely successful in challenging the
admissibility of the prosecution’s victim neuroscience evidence.291 In Part IV, I
discuss the role prosecutorial deference plays in this process. Indeed, my Study
reveals that the prosecution has seemingly unfettered capability to present
neuroscience evidence, beyond even SBS cases, without challenge from the
defense. Unfortunately, this circumstance often comes at the expense of contra-
vening established frameworks of criminal law doctrine, and ultimately, crimi-
nal justice for the accused.
IV. THE DANGERS OF PROSECUTORIAL DEFERENCE
The criminal justice system appears to have embraced, with limited contro-
versy, the use of prosecution victim neuroscience evidence in criminal trials.292
At the same time, the role of SBS as both a medical and legal construct serves
as due warning that the growing acceptance of neuroscience evidence provides
opportunity for both innovation and abuse.
Of the 280 cases in the Neuroscience Study where the prosecutor introduced
victim neuroscience evidence, the defendant challenged the prosecution expert’s
testimony interpreting that victim neuroscience evidence in thirty cases
(10.71%).293 In these cases, the defendant typically argued that the trial court
should have excluded the expert testimony for one of the following four
reasons: (1) the expert’s testimony was unreliable under Daubert/Frye stan-
dards; (2) the witness should not have been allowed to give an expert opinion
on a particular topic or should not have been qualified as an expert in a given
field; (3) the expert impermissibly relied on hearsay evidence; or (4) the
expert’s testimony constituted impermissible rebuttal evidence.294 In twenty-
eight of these cases (93.33%), the court resolved the legal issue in the prosecu-
tion’s favor on appeal.295
These findings are notable. When the prosecution introduces victim neurosci-
ence evidence, this evidence is admitted without objection by the defense or
skepticism from the court. Even on the rare occasions when defendants chal-
lenge the admissibility of expert testimony interpreting victim neuroscience
290. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993)).
291. See App., supra note 80, at XIII.B.
292. But see Ex Parte Roberson, No. WR–63,081–03, 2016 WL 3543332, at *1 (Tex. Crim. App.
June 16, 2016) (stay of execution based on questions concerning SBS evidence); People v. Bailey, WL
6644372 (N.Y. App. Div. Nov. 10, 2016) (vacating a second-degree murder based on shaken baby
syndrome because of medical advances questioning prior assumptions regarding SBS).
293. See App., supra note 80, at XIII.B (dividing 30 by 280). Because the Neuroscience Study cases
consist of appeals, cases were coded where the defendant challenged the admissibility of the prosecu-
tion’s victim neuroscience evidence on appeal, including the specific legal arguments the defendant
made. See id. at XIII.
294. See id.
295. See id. (dividing 28 by 30).
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evidence, the issue is almost always resolved in the prosecution’s favor on
appeal.296
A. CHALLENGES TO VICTIM NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
When attorneys use victim neuroscience evidence at the trial level, the
prosecution indisputably dominates its introduction and subsequent application.
The Neuroscience Study indicated that prosecutors introduced victim neurosci-
ence evidence in 280 of the 286 victim cases (97.90%),297 as compared to the
defense’s use of such evidence in less than one-third of the cases (84 cases or
29.37%).298 When the evidence is introduced for reasons related to the mental
state element of the crime (as it is about half of the time—156 cases or
54.55%),299 this application often occurs during the trial, at the prosecutor’s
request, for the purpose of establishing the defendant’s mental state (122 cases
or 78.21%).300 After introducing victim neuroscience evidence, prosecutors are
also far more likely than the defense to call medical expert witnesses to explain
the evidence. Indeed, expert witness testimony was incorporated into nearly all
of the victim neuroscience cases (277 cases out of 286 total cases, or 96.85%).301
Yet, whereas prosecutors called on experts in 272 cases (95.10%),302 the
defense used such testimony in only 83 cases (29.02%).303
It is unsurprising that medical experts play a key role in victim neuroscience
cases. As Part I mentioned, victim neuroscience evidence usually consists of CT
scans (238 cases or 83.22%), autopsies of the brain (136 cases or 47.55%), and
MRIs (33 cases or 11.54%), all of which would require an expert’s translation in
order to make sense to a judge or jury.304 It is worth noting, though, that in
296. See id. at XI.I–L & XIII.
297. See id. at XIII.A.
298. See App., supra note 80, at XV.
299. See id. at XI.A. For a full breakdown of cases involving victim neuroscience evidence and
mental state, see id. at XI.
300. See id. at XI.B. One case offers an interesting illustration of how victim neuroscience evidence
is used at the trial court level to prove or refute the mental state element of the crime. See Wegner v.
State, 14 P.3d 25 (Nev. 2000), overruled by Rosas v. State, 147 P.3d 1101 (Nev. 2006). In Wegner, the
defendant was charged with first-degree murder in connection with the death of a fourteen-month-old
child who was left in her care. Id. at 26. At trial, the prosecution called nine expert witnesses who
testified that the victim’s CT scans and medical records indicated she died from nonaccidental trauma to
the head which caused a head fracture and hemorrhaging around the brain. Id. at 27–29. In contrast, the
defense’s three experts testified that the victim’s CT scans, and reports from the Mayo Clinic and the
Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, indicated she suffered an extensive brain injury at an earlier date.
Id. at 27. Consequently, these experts believed the victim’s death could have been caused by a
spontaneous rebleed of this original injury, or by minor accidental trauma, that reaggravated the original
injury. Id. at 27, 29. Ultimately, the jury found the prosecution’s experts to be more persuasive and
convicted Wegner of first-degree murder. Id. at 26.
301. See App., supra note 80, at V.A. This distribution includes 194 cases (67.83%) where only the
prosecution used expert testimony, 5 cases (1.75%) where only the defense used expert testimony, and
77 cases (27.27%) where both the prosecution and defense used expert testimony. Id. at V.D–F.
302. Id. at V.B.
303. Id. at V.C.
304. See supra note 86–88 and accompanying text.
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every case where victim neuroscience evidence was used to establish the
defendant’s mental state, the prosecutor relied on medical experts to interpret
the victim’s medical records.305 Moreover, when the defense did use victim
neuroscience evidence to refute a defendant’s mental state at trial, they too
consistently relied on medical expert witness testimony to interpret the victim’s
medical records.306 In this way, medical experts wield a great deal of influence
in trials involving victim neuroscience evidence.
Most of the time, both prosecution307 and defense308 experts testified to the
defendant’s mental state in a general sense (for example, whether the victim’s
injuries were accidental, inflicted, the result of child abuse, or the result of
homicide).309 However, in a handful of cases, prosecution experts testified to
the defendant’s specific mental state (for example, purpose, knowledge, or
intent).310
In eleven of the thirty cases (36.67%) in the Neuroscience Study where the
defendant challenged prosecution expert testimony on appeal, the defendant
argued that the prosecution expert witness was not qualified to offer an opinion
on a particular topic or should not have been qualified in a particular field.311 In
ten of these eleven cases (90.91%), the appellate court resolved the legal issue
in the prosecution’s favor.312 For example, in State v. D’Alessio, the defendant
argued on appeal that the prosecution’s expert, a medical examiner, was not
qualified to offer an expert opinion that the cause of the victim’s death was SBS
because she was “not a specialist” in neuropathology and had “limited experi-
ence” with SBS.313 The court rejected this argument, finding that although the
defendant was “not an expert in the field, [she] testified that she studied and
understood neuropathology” and “explained that a neuropathologist’s opinion
305. See App., supra note 80, at XI.D, XI.E.
306. See id. at XI.F.
307. See id. at XI.D.
308. See id. at XI.F. For example, in State v. Merwin, the defense expert testified that the victim’s
brain injuries “could have been caused by a fall from a bed.” 962 P.2d 1026, 1028 (Idaho 1998). In one
of the twenty cases where defense experts testified to the defendant’s mental state generally, the
defense’s use of victim neuroscience evidence backfired as the defense expert agreed with the
prosecution that the victim’s injuries were nonaccidental. See Richards v. State, 54 S.W.3d 348, 350
(Tex. Ct. App. 2001); App., supra note 80, at XI.F. Additionally, there were three hearings, such as a
postconviction hearing or an evidentiary hearing, where the defendant presented expert testimony
regarding victim neuroscience evidence that tended to refute the mental state element of the crime. See
State v. Kuehn, 728 N.W.2d 589 (Neb. 2007); Maze v. State, No. M2008-01837-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL
4324377 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 2, 2010); State v. Barber, 206 P.3d 1223 (Utah Ct. App. 2009).
309. See App., supra note 80, at XI.D, XI.F. In one case, for example, the prosecution’s expert
testified that the victim’s CT scan showed that the victim suffered significant brain injuries due to
violent shaking and that “[t]he intensity of such shaking would preclude an accidental shaking.” See
Collado v. Commonwealth, 533 S.E.2d 625, 629 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
310. See App., supra note 80, at XI.E.
311. See id. at XIII.E.
312. See id.
313. 848 A.2d 1118, 1122 (R.I. 2004).
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was not necessary to make her diagnosis.”314
In United States v. Iron Hawk, the prosecution presented the testimony at trial
of Dr. Edward Mailloux, a general pediatrician.315 Dr. Mailloux testified that he
reviewed the victim’s CT scans, which indicated the victim suffered permanent
brain injuries.316 On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court abused its
discretion because “there was no foundation to admit Dr. Mailloux’s testimony
as an expert opinion.”317 However, the appellate court rejected this argument,
citing Dr. Mailloux’s employment, training, experience, and familiarity with the
victim’s medical records.318
In eight of the thirty cases (26.67%) in the Neuroscience Study where the
defendant challenged prosecution expert testimony on appeal, the defendant
challenged the prosecution expert testimony on grounds that the expert impermis-
sibly relied on hearsay evidence.319 In five cases, the defense argued that this
reliance violated the defendant’s right to confrontation under the Sixth Amend-
ment.320 In the other three cases, the defendant argued that the reliance was
itself grounds for excluding the testimony.321 In all eight cases (100%), the
appellate court ruled in favor of the prosecution.322
Finally, in two of the thirty cases (6.67%) in the Neuroscience Study where
the defendant challenged prosecution expert testimony on appeal, the defendant
argued that the prosecution expert testimony constituted impermissible rebuttal
evidence.323 The appellate court resolved the expert admissibility issue in favor
of the defense in one of these two cases, Beauchamp v. State.324 Yet Beauchamp
involved an unusual fact pattern. The substance of the prosecution expert’s
testimony was not challenged; rather, it was alleged that the State had violated
certain procedural rules when its expert testimony at trial differed from that at a
deposition.325 The court accepted this argument.326 In another type of case in
which the defense was successful, Commonwealth v. Frangipane, the defense’s
claim was that the expert was not qualified in a particular field. In Frangipane, a
social worker testified to the victim’s psychological problems after an attack.327
The social worker explained how a trauma victim stores and retrieves traumatic
memories and how PET scans aid our understanding of this process.328 It seems
314. Id. at 1124.
315. 612 F.3d 1031, 1035 (8th Cir. 2010).
316. Id. at 1038.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 1038–39.
319. See App., supra note 80, at XIII.F.
320. See id.
321. See id.
322. See id.
323. See id. at XIII.G.
324. See id.
325. 788 N.E.2d 881, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
326. Id.
327. 744 N.E.2d 25, 28–29 (Mass. 2001).
328. Id.
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understandable that a social worker would not possess the requisite expertise to
give such technical testimony, and the court held as such.329
Overall, then, Beauchamp and Frangipane do not represent successful appel-
late challenges to the typical fact pattern involving prosecution neuroscience
evidence. The typical pattern occurs when the prosecution calls a medical
expert to testify to the victim’s physical brain injuries based on a CT scan or a
similar type of victim neuroscience evidence. Rather, Beauchamp and Frangi-
pane illustrate unusual situations in which it is not surprising that courts
supported the defendants’ arguments.
B. CHALLENGES TO VICTIM NEUROSCIENCE EVIDENCE ON APPEAL
The Neuroscience Study shows that the defendant’s mental state is a predomi-
nant focus in cases involving victim neuroscience evidence. In the Study, from
the total sample of 286 cases,330 victim neuroscience evidence was considered
for reasons related to the mental state element of a crime approximately half the
time (156 cases or 54.55%).331 Within those occasions, it was cited on appeal in
eighty-three cases (53.21%) to help establish or refute the defendant’s mental
state.332 In twenty of these cases, the appellate court’s resolution of a contested
legal issue was based at least in part on its finding that the victim neuroscience
evidence presented at trial helped to establish the defendant’s mental state in a
general sense (for example, expert testimony regarding the victim’s medical
records established that the victim’s injuries were nonaccidental, inflicted, the
result of child abuse, or the result of homicide).333 More strikingly, in sixty-
three cases, the appellate court’s resolution of a contested legal issue was based
at least in part on its finding that the victim neuroscience evidence presented at
trial helped to establish the defendant’s specific mental state (for example, that
the defendant knowingly or intentionally caused the victim’s injuries).334
The primary challenge raised by SBS defendants on appeal is sufficiency of
the evidence.335 Indeed, the Neuroscience Study indicates that a considerable
329. Id. at 31–32.
330. App., supra note 80, at I.
331. See id. at XI.A.
332. Id. at XI.C. There is often a strong relationship between how victim neuroscience evidence is
used to show mental state at the trial level and how this same evidence in used on appeal. For example,
in State v. Hales, the prosecution’s expert testified at trial that “[b]ased on the CT scans and the other
medical evidence . . . the injury to Luther must have been nonaccidental and caused by shaken baby
syndrome.” 152 P.3d 321, 340 (Utah 2007). On appeal, the appellate court held that “the jury was
presented with evidence of nonaccidental injuries caused by violent force—evidence from which the
jury could have reasonably inferred that the perpetrator knew that his conduct would create a grave risk
of death and that he acted under circumstances evidencing depraved indifference to human life.” Id. at
337. Thus, the neuroscience evidence presented at trial to establish or refute the defendant’s mental
state is generally used on appeal to resolve a contested legal issue that also involves the defendant’s
mental state.
333. See App., supra note 80, at XI.G.
334. Id. at XI.H.
335. See id. at XI.I.
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number of the victim neuroscience cases on appeal involved sufficiency of the
evidence claims (69 cases or 83.13%).336 In these cases, the defendant argued
that his or her conviction should be overturned due to insufficient evidence in
the record to support the conviction.337 Yet, as Deborah Tuerkheimer points out,
judicial review is a “woefully inadequate” mechanism for overturning doubtful
SBS convictions338 for two key reasons: (1) SBS cases are based primarily on
expert testimony, and the jury determines the credibility of this testimony,339
and (2) insufficiency claims on appeal require that “the evidence must be
viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution.”340
The Supreme Court has held that the jury determines what can be deduced
from the evidence it hears at trial.341 Consequently, “[a] reviewing court may set
aside the jury’s verdict on the ground of insufficient evidence only if no rational
trier of fact could have agreed with the jury.”342 Returning to the case of People
v. Swart, there the prosecution’s whole case centered on medical experts’
testimony that the child died from SBS, whereas the defense offered its own
medical experts who argued that the child died from an earlier accidental
injury.343 On appeal, the defendant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence
adduced at trial.344 The court rejected this argument, finding that the case
came down to conflicting expert testimony and “[t]he jury was free to credit
the State’s experts and discredit defendant’s experts, and the verdict reflects that
the jury did so.”345 The appellate court “in essence” is required to “credit[] the
testimony of the prosecution experts—regardless of whether defense experts
presented an entirely different account—and affirm[] the verdict if the cumula-
tive evidence, however contested, could reasonably support it.”346
336. See id. (69 divided by 83).
337. See id. For example, in People v. Belknap, the defendant argued that “the evidence was
insufficient to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of endangering the life or health of a child,”
but the appellate court concluded that “the evidence was sufficient.” 918 N.E.2d 1233, 1252 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2009). In another case, Richards v. State, the defendant argued that the evidence was insufficient to
establish his intent to cause serious bodily injury to the complainant. 54 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. App.
2001). However, the appellate court found that “medical evidence of the nature presented in this case,
coupled with the evidence that complainant was in appellant’s sole care when he began exhibiting
symptoms of his injuries, is sufficient for the jury to infer appellant’s intent to cause complainant
serious bodily injury.” Id.
338. See TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at xiv.
339. See id. at 175.
340. Id.
341. Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2, 3–4 (2011) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)).
342. Id. at 4.
343. 860 N.E.2d 1142, 1151–56 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); see also supra notes 1–15 and accompanying
text (discussing Swart).
344. Swart, 860 N.E.2d at 1156.
345. Id. at 1160.
346. TUERKHEIMER, supra note 123, at 175.
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Meanwhile, in the case of State v. Fero, the court similarly emphasized its
deference to the prosecution given the medical testimony.347 According to the
court, the State offered the testimony of “several doctors” who had evaluated
the victim following her injury; they “portrayed the injuries as non-accidental,
consistent with the ‘shaken baby syndrome,’ and impossible . . . to have caused
[herself].”348 Consequently, viewing the evidence “in the light most favorable to
the State, and leaving credibility determinations to the jury,” the court deter-
mined that there was sufficient evidence to affirm Fero’s conviction.349
Given the consistency of this deference, it is unsurprising that appellate
courts almost always resolve defendants’ mental state issues in favor of the
prosecution (77 cases out of 83 cases or 92.77%).350 Of the victim neuroscience
cases on appeal that involved sufficiency of the evidence claims, the prosecu-
tion almost always prevailed (66 cases out of 69 cases or 95.65%).351 Prosecu-
tors were similarly successful in cases in which other legal issues involving
victim neuroscience evidence and the defendant’s mental state were appealed.
Out of the ten cases claiming improperly rejected jury instructions,352 prosecu-
tors prevailed in eight of the cases (80%).353 Out of three cases claiming
harmless or plain error analysis, prosecutors prevailed in two (66.67%) of the
cases.354 Prosecutors also prevailed in the single case involving an actual
347. 104 P.3d 49, 55 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), review granted in part, cause remanded by 119 P.3d
852 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
348. Id.
349. Id.
350. See App., supra note 80, at XI.C.
351. See id. at XI.I. For example, in State v. Parker, the court found “there is not sufficient proof in
the record to establish that Defendant ‘knowingly’ killed the victim.” 350 S.W.3d 883, 905 (Tenn.
2011). This conclusion was based partly on the testimony of Dr. Darinka Mileusnic–Polchan, who
explained that, ordinarily, the fall the victim suffered after being struck by the defendant “would not
produce the type of subdural hemorrhage that killed the victim.” Id.
352. See App., supra note 80, at XI.J. Eight of these cases involved requests for a jury instruction
regarding a lesser included offense. Id. For example, in State v. Altum, the defendant argued he was
entitled to a jury instruction on the lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and involuntary
manslaughter. 941 P.2d 1348, 1352 (Kan. 1997). However, the court rejected this argument because
“the medical evidence indicated that the child had been severely beaten and shaken. The type and
extent of his injuries did not permit a reasonable conclusion that the injuries were accidentally
inflicted.” Id. Additionally, one case involved a rejected request for a jury instruction regarding the
defense of accident. See State v. Brooks, 120 Wash. App. 1041, at *12–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004).
Another case involved a rejected request for a jury instruction on intervening cause. See State v. Hanna,
767 N.E.2d 678, 692 (Ohio 2002).
353. See App., supra note 80, at XI.J. In one case, the court found the defendant was entitled to a
jury instruction regarding the lesser included offense of involuntary manslaughter based on facts that
indicated a reduced level of mens rea. See Wegner v. State, 14 P.3d 25, 26, 31 (Nev. 2000), overruled by
Rosas v. State, 147 P.3d 1101 (Nev. 2006).
354. See App., supra note 80, at XI.K. There were three cases on appeal (3.61%) where victim
neuroscience evidence regarding the defendant’s mental state was used as part of the appellate court’s
harmless error or plain error analysis. Id. For example, in State v. Belonga, the court found that
although evidence was improperly admitted, this error was harmless because the jury had before it
overwhelming evidence that the defendant recklessly caused the victim’s death. 42 A.3d 764, 781 (N.H.
2012). This evidence included the testimony of many medical experts who agreed that the victim’s
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innocence claim.355
The appellate court’s deferential standards, however, may not be the only
explanation for these prosecutorial triumphs. As the previous Section discussed,
prosecutors are more likely than defendants to introduce victim neuroscience
evidence at trial. Thus, when an appellate court looks to the trial court record to
resolve a contested legal issue involving the defendant’s mental state, the
available victim neuroscience evidence will strongly favor the prosecution.356
There were only three cases where the defendant appealed a trial court’s
decision to exclude victim neuroscience evidence introduced by the defense; yet
all three cases attacked the expert testimony rather than the victim neuroscience
evidence itself.357 That there were only three cases on appeal where the
defendant argued that the trial court improperly excluded victim neuroscience
evidence again suggests that victim neuroscience evidence is routinely admitted
into criminal trials without controversy. If trial courts were regularly excluding
victim neuroscience evidence introduced by the defense, presumably one would
expect to find many more cases where the defendant challenged these decisions
on appeal. This finding also suggests that there is seemingly no disparate
treatment against defendants in the context of victim neuroscience evidence:
courts admit such evidence regardless of whether it is introduced by the
prosecution or the defense. At the same time, it is clear that the prosecution is
far more likely to introduce this evidence than the defense.
C. DAUBERT/FRYE CHALLENGES
Defendants challenged the reliability of prosecution expert testimony under
Daubert/Frye standards in ten of the thirty cases (33.33%) where the defendant
challenged prosecution expert testimony on appeal.358 SBS cases provided the
most common context for this type of challenge in eight of the cases (80%).359
In these SBS cases, the defendant claimed that the SBS diagnosis is not
injuries were nonaccidental and that they likely occurred while the victim was in the custody of the
defendant. Id. at 781–83. Yet, in State v. Mascarenas, the appellate court found the trial court erred in
its definition of criminal negligence and that this error was not harmless because the extent of how
severely and how often the victim was shaken was a disputed issue at trial. 4 P.3d 1221, 1225–26 (N.M.
2000). The jury could have concluded the defendant acted with mere carelessness as opposed to
reckless disregard for the victim’s health and safety. Id. at 1226.
355. See App., supra note 80, at XI.L. There was one (1.43%) case where the defendant appealed the
denial of his habeas corpus petition alleging “actual innocence” due to newly discovered evidence. In
Rozzelle v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, the defendant argued that “if the ‘new’
evidence were introduced, no reasonable juror would have found that he acted with a ‘depraved mind’
and convicted him of second-degree murder.” 672 F.3d 1000, 1008 (11th Cir. 2012). However, the court
rejected this argument, noting that “[t]he extreme trauma Rozzelle so rapidly inflicted on Leier is itself
compelling evidence of Rozzelle’s depraved mind.” Id. at 1021.
356. See supra Section IV.A.
357. See App., supra note 80, at XI.K.
358. See id. at XIII.C.
359. See id. at XIII.D. It should be noted there was one other case involving a Daubert/Frye
challenge. However, for this case, the State appealed a lower court’s decision to exclude evidence on
Daubert grounds. See Commonwealth v. Martin, 290 S.W.3d 59, 64–65 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008).
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generally accepted in the scientific community and is not based on reliable
scientific methods.360 In the two non-SBS cases, the defendant challenged
respectively the reliability of expert testimony regarding the victim’s mental
state and the reliability of expert testimony regarding the timing of the victim’s
injuries.361 In all ten cases (100%), the appellate court resolved the Daubert/
Frye challenge in the prosecution’s favor.362
In one SBS case, State v. Leibhart, the appellate court noted that the trial
court had conducted a Daubert hearing to assess the admissibility of the SBS
evidence and had found it to be admissible.363 Specifically, the trial court
concluded that SBS had been “peer reviewed, it ha[d] been clinically tested
as the best it can and it has [a] small error rate.”364 The court also explained that
there was “considerable literature put out by professional scientific organiza-
tions that substantiate the findings” and that SBS “is generally accepted within
the scientific medical community of pediatrics.”365 The trial court found that the
prosecution expert testimony concerning SBS was “scientifically reliable” and
“would assist the jury in understanding the evidence and in determining specific
issues that arose within the case.”366 The appellate court affirmed the trial
court’s findings, explaining that the expert testimony concerning SBS was
relevant to the facts at issue in Leibhart “because such injuries were similar to
the injury sustained by [the victim] and causes other than shaken baby syn-
drome could be excluded.”367
Similarly, in People v. Armstrong, the defendant was convicted of involuntary
manslaughter and sentenced to seven years in prison.368 At trial, the defendant
requested a Frye hearing to assess the admissibility of expert testimony concern-
ing SBS evidence;369 yet the trial court determined that a Frye hearing was
unnecessary because the SBS diagnosis “is generally accepted in the medical
and legal communities and Illinois courts have applied it universally.”370 The
trial court also rendered “that any controversy surrounding the syndrome goes
to the weight of the evidence, to be tested during cross-examination and by any
contrary evidence at trial.”371 The defendant filed a motion for reconsideration,
360. See App., supra note 80, at XIII.D.
361. See State v. Kuehn, 728 N.W.2d 589, 598–99 (Neb. 2007); State v. Barrow, 718 S.E.2d 673,
677 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011), aff’d in part, review dismissed in part, 727 S.E.2d 546 (N.C. 2012); App.,
supra note 80, at XIII.C.
362. See App., supra note 80, at XIII.C; see also Joe¨lle Anne Moreno, What Happens When Dirty
Harry Becomes an (Expert) Witness for the Prosecution?, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2004) (discussing the
extent to which the prosecution survives challenges to expert testimony relative to the defense).
363. 662 N.W.2d 618, 627–28 (Neb. 2003).
364. Id. at 627.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 627–28.
367. Id. at 628.
368. 919 N.E.2d 57, 60 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009).
369. Id. at 67.
370. Id.
371. Id.
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attaching as support a broad range of medical journal articles criticizing the
soundness of the SBS diagnosis along with court cases from other jurisdictions
rejecting the admissibility of SBS; yet the trial court found the articles “inappo-
site” and denied the motion.372
The defendant persisted, arguing on appeal that “the trial court erred in taking
judicial notice that the ‘highly controversial’ diagnosis of [SBS] is generally
accepted without first holding a hearing under Frye.”373 The appellate court first
noted that “[t]he ‘general acceptance’ test set forth in Frye provides that
scientific evidence is admissible at trial only if the methodology or scientific
principle upon which the opinion is based is ‘sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.’”374
Unfortunately, however, Armstrong would not be the case to address such a key
matter concerning the use and admissibility of SBS in criminal cases.375 As the
Armstrong court noted, a retrial without the SBS testimony would not have
changed the verdict.376 Yet the Armstrong court acknowledged the importance
of these questions and that they may be up to another court to decide.377
Overall then, although SBS remains firmly planted in the criminal justice
system for now, it is virtually always used to the benefit of the prosecution in
victim neuroscience cases and commonly employed for the purposes of proving
a defendant’s intent. The dominance of SBS is especially pronounced in cases in
which little to no other circumstantial evidence is available. Part V suggests that
the troublesome role of SBS is the canary in the mineshaft: SBS is simply a
more transparent example of other legal strategies that are increasingly turning
to neuroscience for help in determining a defendant’s mental state, for better or
for worse.
V. THE BROADER PICTURE OF CONCOCTING INTENT
This Article has discussed the perfect storm aspect of SBS diagnoses in
creating intent in criminal cases. But SBS cases are simply a microcosm of a
larger picture of problems with assessing mens rea. This Part analyzes some of
the Neuroscience Study’s adult-victim cases to provide context and to demon-
strate how they were handled relative to the SBS cases.
In the Neuroscience Study, adult-victim cases were far more factually and
scientifically varied than the cases involving children and SBS. In addition, the
adult-victim cases had substantially more circumstantial evidence for courts to
372. Id.
373. Id. at 73.
374. Armstrong, 919 N.E.2d at 73.
375. Id. at 75.
376. See id.
377. Id.; see also Narang, supra note 145, at 247, 249 (noting that “biochemical and metabolic
responses to brain injury are significantly different in the young infant compared to the older child or
adult” and highlighting the “[m]ultiple differences—in tissue composition, brain and skull properties,
and brain vulnerability—between adults and children”).
2017] 369CONCOCTING CRIMINAL INTENT
use to decipher the defendant’s level of intent, far beyond simply the neurosci-
ence evidence. For example, no adult-victim case relied solely on the victim
neuroscience evidence, but they included other types of evidence that courts
typically consider, such as the relationship between the defendant and the
victim, eyewitness testimony, and additional injury testimony.378
A. THE NEUROSCIENCE STUDY’S ADULT CASES
In total, adult victims constituted slightly less than one-third of all the victims
in the Neuroscience Study—ninety-four adults or 30.32% of all victims.379 Of
that number, nearly one-fifth—sixteen individuals or 17.02%—were victims in
cases in which prosecutors used the neuroscientific evidence to reinforce a
determination of the defendant’s mental state.380 This Part focuses on those
sixteen cases.
Each case within the collection of sixteen features a victim who sustained
serious head injuries, usually fatal, with common characteristics such as severe
trauma, subdural hemorrhaging, and eventual brain death.381 Reflecting the
severity of the injuries and the usually fatal results, six of the sixteen cases
involved defendants facing a death sentence,382 with the remaining defendants
facing a life sentence383 or a closely equivalent sentence.384 The severity of the
victims’ injuries typically resulted in medical screening and emergency action
by medical professionals; therefore, the neuroscience evidence in these cases
commonly included CT scans and X-rays, as well as autopsy evidence and
accompanying experts who testified in court.385
378. See App., supra note 80, at VI.G–M.
379. See id.
380. See id. at XVII. The sixteen cases are: Rozzelle v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000,
1002–06, 1018–21 (11th Cir. 2012); Johnson v. Upton, 615 F.3d 1318, 1321–26, 1333–35 (11th Cir.
2010); Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 520–23 (6th Cir. 2006); State v. Dorans, 806 A.2d 1033,
1037–39, 1045–46 (Conn. 2002); Taylor v. State, 87 So. 3d 749, 755 (Fla. 2012); People v. Nelson, 922
N.E.2d 1056, 1062–64, 1071–72 (Ill. 2009); People v. Pertz, 610 N.E.2d 1321, 1337, 1351 (Ill. App. Ct.
1993); Norris v. State, 943 N.E.2d 362, 364–65, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); State v. George, 19 So. 3d
614, 617–20 (La. Ct. App. 2009); State v. Clifton, 701 N.W.2d 793, 796, 801 (Minn. 2005); State v.
Rothacher, 901 P.2d 82, 83–89 (Mont. 1995); State v. Vandeweaghe, 799 A.2d 1, 4–5 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2002), aff’d, 827 A.2d 1028 (N.J. 2003); State v. Watson, 618 A.2d 367, 368–69 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1992); State v. Hanna, 767 N.E.2d 678, 685–87 (Ohio 2002); State v. Parker, 350 S.W.3d
883, 888–92, 904–05 (Tenn. 2011); Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 87–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
381. See, e.g., Carter, 443 F.3d at 520–23; Norris, 943 N.E.2d at 364–65; Vandeweaghe, 799 A.2d at
4–5. Not all the head injuries neatly fit this pattern. See, e.g., Johnson, 615 F.3d at 1324, 1333–35
(hitting of officer in the head with butt of a gun may or may not have contributed to officer’s fatal
stroke months later); Hanna, 767 N.E.2d at 685–87 (stabbing of cellmate in eye caused object to
penetrate brain stem, leading to infection and death).
382. See Johnson, 615 F.3d at 1321; Carter, 433 F.3d at 520, 523; Taylor, 87 So. 3d at 753; Nelson,
922 N.E.2d at 1059; Hanna, 767 N.E.2d at 685–86; Felder, 848 S.W.2d at 87–88.
383. See Clifton, 701 N.W.2d at 796; Vandeweaghe, 799 A.2d at 3; Watson, 618 A.2d at 368.
384. See, e.g., Pertz, 610 N.E.2d at 1325 (involving a sentence of forty-five years).
385. See, e.g., Dorans, 806 A.2d at 1038–39, 1045–46 (upholding the trial court’s finding that the
defendant was guilty of manslaughter and that the evidence supported the necessary element of
recklessness, based on in part the following circumstances: that defendant hit his coworker in the head
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Most importantly, these cases used neuroscience evidence for similar pur-
poses. In all cases, the neuroscience evidence not only served the narrative
purpose of describing the defendants’ serious crimes, but it often also provided
critical proof of the defendants’ acts.386 In several of the cases, neuroscience
evidence admitted at trial was used to directly show, at least in part, the
requisite mental element.387 In addition, the cases were not limited to a determi-
nation of intent, but also included a showing of various states of mental
culpability.388 For example, in State v. Clifton, medical evidence was employed
in part to prove that the defendant was the killer and that he had the necessary
premeditation.389 Neuroscience testimony has been applied elsewhere to show
that a defendant’s actions were in fact the cause of death.390
B. THE PLIABILITY OF INTENT
The Neuroscience Study’s sixteen defendant cases also reflect the pliability of
how courts viewed intent, knowledge, or recklessness and how they used
neuroscience evidence to assess these mens rea levels.391 As would be expected,
a number of the adult-victim cases involved injuries in which the intent could be
determined in ways consistent with traditional criminal law doctrine and expec-
tations. For example, two cases concerned a prison inmate brutally attacking
another inmate, inflicting injuries so severe that a court’s finding of the defen-
dant’s intent was not surprising.392 Other cases involved defendants inflicting
during an argument, a CT scan that showed that “the victim was suffering from life threatening
intracranial pressure,” and a CT scan and autopsy evidence that confirmed the injury was due to
blunt-force trauma despite other findings of a brain condition that could have been a contributing
factor).
386. See App., supra note 80, at VI.G–M. All cases consisted of appellate opinions, and the issue of
the defendant’s mental culpability in committing the offense consistently arose in a “sufficiency” claim
where the defendant argued on appeal that there was insufficient evidence supporting the necessary
mens rea. See id.
387. See id. This goal is not as definitive as one might think. In a number of cases, the court held that
there was sufficient proof the defendant acted with the requisite mental state but, because the court also
relied on other evidence, it could not be determined whether the medical evidence contributed to that
finding as a significant factor, a minor factor, or no factor at all. See supra notes 388–89 and
accompanying text (examining cases linking behavior with mental state and culpability).
388. See, e.g., Rozzelle v. Sec’y, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 672 F.3d 1000, 1002–06 (11th Cir. 2012)
(finding of a killing with a “depraved mind”); Dorans, 806 A.2d at 1037–39, 1045–46 (noting that a CT
scan contributed to the finding that the defendant possessed the required mental state of “reckless-
ness”); Pertz, 610 N.E.2d at 1325, 1325 (determining that medical testimony concerning the size of a
wound on the victim’s head helped establish that the defendant acted “with the intent to kill her and
with the knowledge that such acts created a strong probability of death to her”); State v. Parker, 350
S.W.3d 883, 904–05, 910 (Tenn. 2011) (concluding that medical evidence was insufficient to support
“knowing” murder, but did establish “reckless” murder).
389. 701 N.W.2d 793, 796, 801 (Minn. 2005).
390. See State v. Rothacher, 901 P.2d 82, 84 (Mont. 1995).
391. See App., supra note 80, at XVII.
392. Carter v. Mitchell, 443 F.3d 517, 520–23 (6th Cir. 2006) (defendant stomping on decedent’s
head); State v. Hanna, 767 N.E.2d 678, 685–86 (Ohio 2002) (defendant plunging a paintbrush into
decedent’s eye).
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direct and transparent injuries to particularly helpless adult victims, such as one
defendant who stabbed to death a quadriplegic during a robbery393 or another
defendant who bludgeoned and burned an entire family.394
In other cases, however, the level of the defendant’s intentionality and
causation was far less clear, particularly in circumstances involving potentially
intervening causes or alternative explanations. In Norris v. State, for example,
the appellate court upheld the trial court’s finding that the defendant was guilty
of the murder—rather than the involuntary manslaughter—of his live-in girl-
friend.395 The court focused on the defendant’s motive (sexual jealousy), a
confession that he slapped his girlfriend and caused her to fall and hit her head,
as well as his failure to seek medical care for her after the slap or even when he
found his girlfriend unresponsive the next morning.396 According to the defen-
dant, although he intended to slap his girlfriend, he did not intend for her to fall
and hit her head on the side of the dresser and the wall, which ultimately killed
her.397 Yet the judge rejected the defendant’s request for jury instructions at trial
regarding involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder.398
The court relied heavily on the medical and neuroscience evidence, including
the victim’s autopsy results and a neurologist’s interpretation of a CT scan
indicating that the victim’s brain injury was caused by “significant trauma” to
show that the defendant intended to kill.399 Yet the source of the trauma (the
slap or the fall) remained unclear.400 Another court could therefore question
whether there was sufficient evidence to prove the defendant’s intent and leave
it to the jury to decide with an instruction for manslaughter.
The questionable nature of such causality determinations based on victim
neuroscience evidence is even more pronounced in State v. Rothacher.401 In
Rothacher, the defendant was charged with deliberate homicide in connection
with the death of the victim with whom he had fought outside of a bar.402
Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of mitigated deliberate
homicide, and he appealed.403 Although the Montana Supreme Court found
error in a jury instruction concerning the defendant’s intent to cause the harm, it
held this error harmless, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction,
and affirmed.404
The nature of the “intent to cause” error is troubling in this case. The facts
393. Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 87–90 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
394. People v. Nelson, 922 N.E.2d 1056, 1059–65, 1071–72 (Ill. 2009).
395. 943 N.E.2d 362, 363–64 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011).
396. Id. at 365–66, 370–71.
397. Id.
398. Id. at 366–67.
399. Id. at 364–65, 370.
400. See id.
401. 901 P.2d 82 (Mont. 1995).
402. Id. at 83.
403. Id. at 84.
404. Id. at 87–89.
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show that the defendant struck the victim in the head two times, at which point
the victim “fell on his back and hit his head hard on the ice.”405 The defendant
then kicked the victim in the head.406 The victim was taken to the hospital
where a neurosurgeon administered a CT scan that “revealed extensive bruising
on [the victim’s] brain.”407 Although surgery was performed to relieve pressure
on the brain, the extent of the victim’s injuries was so great that the procedure
proved unsuccessful.408 In testimony, the neurosurgeon concluded that it was
the defendant’s kick to the victim’s head after his fall that caused the fatal
injury.409 The defendant was sentenced to sixteen years in prison.410
The main issue before the court concerned the jury instruction that the
appellate court later determined to be erroneous but also harmless.411 That jury
instruction indicates how jury instructions regarding intent can be convoluted.
As the instruction stated:
In order to convict the defendant of Deliberate Homicide, it is not neces-
sary . . . to prove that the defendant intended to cause [the] death of [the]
victim. Death may not be the intended result, but, if the act which causes the
death is done purposely, . . . deliberate homicide is committed unless the
result is too remote or accidental to have a bearing on the offender[’]s liability
or on the gravity of the offense.412
In essence, if the defendant did not intend the victim’s death, but did intend the
act preceding it, the court could convict the defendant of deliberate homicide.
Although the appellate court recognized the causal disconnect between the
defendant’s act and his intent in the jury instruction,413 it avoided the error in
other equally problematic ways. In the court’s view, “[a] defendant can properly
be convicted of deliberate homicide even though he may not have intended that
the death result from the act where he contemplated the same kind of harm or
injury to the victim.”414 The defendant’s admission that he hit and kicked the
victim, coupled with the medical testimony, led the court to hold that there was
still sufficient evidence to show that the defendant had “knowingly caused” the
victim’s death.415 Thus, because “knowingly” was still a sufficient mens rea for
deliberate homicide, the jury instruction was considered harmless despite the
highly troublesome and expanded definition of “knowingly” in the instruction.
405. Id. at 83.
406. Id.
407. See Rothacher, 901 P.2d at 83–84.
408. Id. at 84.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id. at 84–88.
412. Id. at 84 (alterations and emphasis in original).
413. See Rothacher, 901 P.2d at 84–87.
414. Id. at 85 (quoting State v. Van Dyken, 791 P.2d 1350, 1362 (Mont. 1990)).
415. Id. at 89.
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C. AN ADULT VICTIM WITH SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME SYMPTOMS
The pliable nature of intent is perhaps most pronounced when close compari-
sons can be made between SBS cases involving infants and those involving
physically fragile adults. One of my Neuroscience Study cases, State v. Parker,
allows such a comparison.416
In Parker, the defendant sexually assaulted the victim in her bedroom,
whereupon she escaped to her neighbor’s apartment wearing only a shirt.417 The
neighbor called 911, and the police and the ambulance soon arrived.418 A nurse
who evaluated the victim at the hospital later testified that the victim reported to
her that “a friend of her son had tried to rape her with his hand and had choked
her” as well as “put her to the ground and then bent her legs up over her
head.”419 The victim also complained of a headache, remarking that this was
common when she was stressed, and the nurse gave her some Tylenol.420 The
victim later stated that her headache was better, and the hospital released her
about four hours after she was first admitted.421
The following day, the victim was found dead in her home.422 An autopsy
revealed that there was no evidence of sexual penetration, but there was a
subdural hemorrhage “between the hard covering of the brain and the brain
itself.”423 The doctor who performed the autopsy determined that the cause of
death was blunt trauma to the victim’s head.424 She made three additional
conclusions: (1) the victim had died on the morning after the attack; (2) the
injury that created the hemorrhage was inflicted near the time of the attack and
not after the victim’s release from the hospital; and (3) “[t]he main symptom
from this type of trauma would be a headache.”425
At trial, the victim was described as “‘slender and small,’ weighing less than
one hundred pounds.”426 The doctor who testified that the cause of death was
subdural hemorrhage resulting from trauma further elaborated on the meaning
of her diagnosis: “It could be a blow, it could be a fall and could be also any
mechanism that is going to her head to perform like a sudden decelera-
tion . . . .”427 The doctor explained further that “elderly people do take a little bit
less trauma than younger people . . . however, it has to be enough severe trauma
to cause it. It cannot be just any household fall for that matter.”428 On cross-
416. 350 S.W.3d 883 (Tenn. 2011).
417. Id. at 889.
418. Id.
419. Id. at 891.
420. Id.
421. Id.
422. Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 891.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id. at 892.
426. Id. at 891.
427. Id.
428. Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 892.
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examination, the doctor acknowledged that “the autopsy revealed no external
injuries to the top or side of the victim’s head,” nor was there a skull fracture.429
Similarly, on cross-examination, the examining nurse acknowledged that “she
had not observed on the victim ‘any bumps, bruises, cuts, abrasions to [the]
head, scalp, face, ears, neck, shoulders, back, legs, [or] knees.’”430 However, the
doctor described the victim’s injury as “‘a classic deceleration injury,’ an
example of which is ‘the head being violently either going forward or backward
fast and then stopping suddenly, the brain continuing to move, bouncing against
the inside of the skull.’”431 Although diagnosed in an adult, this kind of injury
comes close to descriptions of diagnoses attributable to SBS.432
The defendant went to trial for first-degree felony murder and attempted
rape.433 At the close of trial, the judge informed counsel that “he planned to
instruct the jury on the charged offense of first-degree felony murder; second-
degree murder; reckless homicide; and criminally negligent homicide.”434 In
contrast to some SBS cases discussed in this Article, the trial court allowed the
jury to pick among a range of different mental states represented by different
degrees of criminal homicide. The jury found the defendant guilty of second-
degree murder and attempted rape.435
The primary issue on appeal concerned the defendant’s conviction for second-
degree murder, which the court vacated due to a lack of proof.436 However, the
court did find sufficient evidence to support convicting the defendant of reckless
homicide and remanded the case for amendment of the judgment to reflect a
conviction for that offense and a sentencing hearing.437
The court first noted that the statutory definition of second-degree murder,
defined as “[a] knowing killing of another,” required the State to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the following two factors: (1) the actus reus, in that the
defendant committed the act of killing the victim, and (2) the mens rea, in that
the defendant killed the victim with “a ‘knowing’ state of mind.”438 With
respect to the defendant’s actus reus, the testimony of the attending doctor and
429. Id.
430. Id. at 891 (alteration in original).
431. Id. at 892.
432. Shaken Adult Syndrome does exist. See Amir A. Azari et al., Shaken Adult Syndrome: Report of
2 Cases, 131 JAMA OPHTHALMOLOGY 1468, 1468 (2013) (noting that “[t]he intracranial and ophthalmo-
logic findings that are characteristic of abusive head trauma—subdural hemorrhages, optic nerve sheath
hemorrhages, and retinal hemorrhages—are generally thought to be limited to young children and
infants” but that adults can also suffer from such abuse and that medical investigation should be made if
shaking is suspected); see also Derrick J. Pounder, Shaken Adult Syndrome, 18 AM. J FORENSIC MED. &
PATHOLOGY 321, 322–23 (discussing “the first reported instance of fatal ‘shaken adult syndrome’”
presumably caused by “violent shaking” even though the deceased’s visible injuries “were remarkably
few”).
433. Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 889 n.1.
434. Id. at 895.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 888.
437. Id. at 911.
438. Id. at 903–04.
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examining nurse was sufficient to show that the defendant had caused the
victim’s death.439 With respect to the defendant’s mens rea, however, the court
found there was insufficient evidence.440 A “knowing” state of mind necessary
for second-degree murder requires that the defendant is “aware that [his]
conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.”441 Yet the court found no
proof that the defendant was aware that his treatment of the victim was
“reasonably certain” to cause her death.442 It cited, by way of example, the lack
of exterior wounds to the victim, which would be expected if defendant had
“deliberately slammed [the victim’s] head onto a hard surface.”443 In addition,
the court emphasized that there was “no proof in the record that simply pushing
someone to the floor . . . is reasonably certain to cause their death.”444
With these conclusions stated, the court noted that the lower appellate court
had agreed that there was insufficient proof of the “knowing” mens rea ele-
ment.445 The defendant had only been convicted of second-degree murder
(originally a part of the indictment but dismissed by the State prior to trial)
“because it was charged to the jury by the trial court as a lesser-included offense
of first degree felony murder.”446 The main legal issue in dispute was whether
the conviction could “nevertheless be affirmed because there was sufficient
evidence to support the greater offense of felony murder.”447 The court dis-
cussed past precedent suggesting that such a conviction could stand, ultimately
holding that the second-degree murder conviction must be vacated but finding
sufficient proof to support “reckless” homicide.448
Parker offers a sharp contrast to the mental state determinations for defen-
dants in SBS cases. Even though the defendant intentionally and brutally
assaulted the victim and there was unquestionable evidence that the assault took
place, the court found “no proof” that the defendant was aware that such actions
would cause the victim’s death.449 Indeed, as support for that conclusion, the
court pointed to the victim’s lack of exterior wounds.450 Although the court
found sufficient proof to convict the defendant of reckless homicide, it found no
evidence that he acted either intentionally or knowingly.451 Yet in SBS cases,
courts have convicted defendants of first-degree murder based upon little more
439. Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 904.
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Id. at 904–05.
443. Id. at 905.
444. Id.
445. Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 904.
446. Id. at 905.
447. Id.
448. Id. at 905–10.
449. Id. at 904–05.
450. Id. at 905.
451. Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 904–05.
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than one or more medical experts’ determinations of SBS.452 These convictions
stand regardless of questionable evidence that the defendant inflicted any injury
on the child victim, much less possessed the intent to kill.453 Even though the
Parker court recognized the particular fragility of the elderly victim’s size and
age, the court still found no evidence that the defendant had been aware that he
was “reasonably certain” to cause her death.454 Yet in SBS cases, courts feel
free to draw such connections between a defendant’s mens rea and actus reus
concerning the particular fragility of infants455—despite an overwhelming body
of research and testimony indicating that defendants are often unaware their acts
can cause such damage.456
The adult-victim cases therefore demonstrate the pros and cons of victim
neuroscience evidence when it comes to manufacturing intent. As the Parker
case illustrates, for example, courts can rely on neuroscience evidence to
suggest a lower level of mens rea for a defendant—recklessness rather than
knowledge or intent.457 On the other hand, Norris and Rothacher illustrate how
courts can contrive a defendant’s mental state with no more causal proof than
what was before the Parker court.458 SBS cases operate at the extreme end of
the continuum, where courts equate a syndrome with fulfilling both a defen-
dant’s mens rea and actus reus irrespective of any other evidence.
The criminal justice system will increasingly rely on neuroscience for a range
of reasons, including to assess a defendant’s mental state. Such reliance brings
the hope of greater clarity and insight into criminal cases, but also the risk of
pronounced abuse. The challenges concerning the manufacturing of criminal
intent, then, extend past SBS and child-victim cases to a more overarching
perspective on mens rea. Whichever direction that inquiry leads depends on
large-scale research that can regularly monitor the reality of how science and
law intersect.
CONCLUSION
A defendant’s mens rea, specifically criminal intent, is the most critical
element in the criminal law, yet it is an amorphous concept. The history of mens
rea illustrates how courts have long struggled to define intent, with efforts at
clarification often leading to greater confusion. As a result, prosecutors attempt
452. See, e.g., People v. Swart, 860 N.E.2d 1142 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006). In the Neuroscience Study of
286 cases, there were 60 cases in which the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. See App.,
supra note 80, at XVIII. Of those 60 cases, 18 (30 percent) involved SBS. Id. at XVIII.A. In addition,
there were 14 SBS cases where the court failed to instruct the jury on an offense requiring a lesser
mental state than the offense for which the defendant had been charged. Id. at XVIII.B.
453. See, e.g., id.
454. Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 905.
455. See, e.g., Norris v. State, 943 N.E.2d 362, 364–65, 370 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011); State v. Rothacher,
901 P.2d 82, 83–89 (Mont. 1995).
456. See supra Part II.D.
457. Parker, 350 S.W.3d at 910–11.
458. Norris, 943 N.E.2d at 364–65, 370; Rothacher, 901 P.2d at 83–89.
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to prove mens rea through the use of circumstantial evidence and frequently
must “concoct” the defendant’s level of intent to some degree. With the
emergence of neuroscience evidence, it seems that prosecutors have found the
ultimate tool to do so. Yet inappropriate reliance on scans of a victim’s brain
injuries leads to a level of speculation and impact that defies both the purposes
of the science as well as its appropriate role within the criminal justice system.
Nonetheless, my research indicates that this approach is surprisingly effective
for prosecutors. Courts defer to prosecutors’ efforts to manufacture intent out of
victim brain scans that were taken and admitted solely for medical purposes. In
my Neuroscience Study, nearly half of the cases involving victim neuroscience
evidence are based on a theory of SBS, a medical diagnosis for which the
scientific underpinnings have become increasingly controversial. The syndrome
is unique in its legal ramifications: a diagnosis of SBS often successfully serves
as the sole basis for a prosecutor’s case, with no proof of a defendant’s act or
intent beyond the victim’s brain scan and the accompanying medical expert
testimony. Although reliance on circumstantial evidence is nothing new, these
cases are unusual in the extent to which prosecutors must go to construct mens
rea. Moreover, the syndrome’s history indicates that it was never intended to be
used in this way; indeed, this practice has been disparaged in recent years by
numerous scientists, including the syndrome’s creator.
SBS cases, however, are simply one part of a broader problem with the role
and development of mens rea in a criminal justice system that is increasingly
turning to neuroscience for rescue. Although the criminal law needs neurosci-
ence to help elucidate and refine outmoded conceptions of mental state, such
innovations can come with the baggage of misuse. Large-scale research projects
such as this Article’s Neuroscience Study can detect existing or potential
misapplications of neuroscience with an eye toward amelioration.
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